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Mitigating Impact of National Systems of Innovation on the 
Severity of the Global Recession: Comparison of Selected Asian 
Economies 
 
Angathevar Baskaran* and Mammo Muchie** 
 
 
Abstract 
The research question we wish to investigate is the degree to which different 
Asian countries with differing levels of NSI strength and weakness cope in 
mitigating some of the adverse impacts of the recession. What we mean by 
mitigating capability is the ability of NSI to deal with and respond to unforeseen 
or foreseen crisis that could be induced internally or externally or by the 
combination of both domestic and internationals factors. In our previous 
research (Baskaran and Muchie, 2009), using descriptive comparative data, we 
examined how far the relative strength or weakness of NSI within the transition 
economies of the BRICS (Brazil, India, China, and South Africa – excluding 
Russia) is capable of mitigating the adverse impact of the recession. The early 
evidence emerging from these case countries suggested that the nature and 
degree of impact of the recession in these economies are different. We attempted 
to show that these differences are mainly due to the nature and distinct 
characteristics of the NSIs in these economies other things being equal. We 
would like to add new insights relating NSI to coping with the impact of current 
recession of the global economy through further research into selected Asian 
economies and comparing them.  
 
For this, we employ a heuristic conceptual framework which presents a 
taxonomy of NSIs as: (i) developed/matured; (ii) transitional/learning; and (iii) 
nascent/weak; and also identifies 6 major sets of NSI components: (i) General 
investment climate and economic policy framework; (ii) Market, per capita 
income, and domestic savings; (iii) Industrial structure; (iv) Financial 
Institutions; (v) Foreign Trade; and (vi) Skills, R&D and Technology 
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development. The degree of strength of these NSI components and interaction 
between them will make an NSI as either developed/matured, 
transitional/learning, and nascent/weak. The important issue we are highlighting 
here is that although there are many similarities between systems of innovation, 
there are also differences related to the stage of development, characteristics of 
NSI evolution, path dependency, institutions, laws, policies, and incentives. 
These in turn are likely to have either strong, relatively strong or weak 
mitigating impact on recession. We attempt to show this by selecting two case 
countries to represent each type of NSI in our conceptual framework and 
comparing these three sets of economies (in all, 6 countries). We are 
contributing by adding to the existing body of NSI literature by linking NSI 
framework to its potential mitigating impact on recession in national economies.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
The current global recession and financial crisis which was triggered in 2007 by 
the collapse of the sub-prime mortgage market in the United States (US) has 
affected almost every national economy in varying degrees. Most of the 
developed economies appear to have felt the immediate impact and the rest of 
the world felt the impact gradually. Some economies were more seriously 
affected by than the others. Some economies are witnessing some signs of 
recovery from the recession while others are still struggling to overcome the 
impact. Overall, the direct and indirect effects of the financial crisis in the 
Western developed economies on other regions were expected to be very 
significant. Multilateral organisations such as the UN identified that developing 
countries could be affected by lower demand for exports, reduced commodity 
prices, reduced capital inflows, delayed investments, and exchange rate 
volatility (United Nations 2009; AfDB et al, 2008, Economic Commission for 
Africa, 2008). 
 
The likely nature and shape of impact of the recession in the advanced 
economies on the developing world and the emerging economies have attracted 
a lot of attention and the world multilateral institutions such the UN and IMF 
have come up with reports and individual experts have made some observations 
and statements. There seemed to be a consensus that among the developing and 
emerging economies some countries would be affected the most severely than 
others due to economy-specific factors and characteristics. For example, in the 
banking/ financial sector which triggered the credit crunch in the developed 
economies it was argued that the emerging economies such as BICS would not 
be affected to the extent of developed economies. Furthermore, it was also 
argued that the impact on even the banking/financial sectors among the BRICS 
economies would be different (Poshakwale, 2008). 
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This caught our attention and we came up with the argument that these 
differences are mainly due to the nature and distinct characteristics of the NSIs 
in these economies other things being equal. We carried out a study of BICS 
economies to examine how far the relative strength or weakness of the NSI 
within these economies is capable of mitigating the adverse impact of the 
recession. Our assumption that countries in transition are evolving strong NSI 
that can cope with recessionary downturn appears to be borne out by the 
available data and the six identified NSI characteristics, showing despite the 
problems, the economies are broadly on course to see this recession and through 
and come out stronger. What came out forcefully was how important it is to 
frame the challenge of the recession by using the NSI of a country. 
 
Therefore, we propose to use the same approach to examine further how far the 
relative strength or weakness of the NSI within different Asian economies -- 
South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, Thailand, Bangladesh, and Nepal -- is capable 
of mitigating the adverse impact of the recession. For this, we would like to take 
only the NSI factor in trying to account how the nature and degree of impact of 
the recession across countries are likely to be different across selected case 
countries. We expect our research would advance new insights both to the 
significance and value of strengthening the NSI and how a potential to mitigate 
the severity of the global recession in emerging economies is associated with 
NSI development in given transition economies.  
 
The paper is structured as following: section 2 presents a conceptual framework 
to link and analyse the NSI and its potential mitigating impact on global 
recession; section 3 to 8 presents individual cases (South Korea, Taiwan, 
Malaysia, Thailand, Bangladesh, and Nepal respectively), section 9 provides 
analysis of the cases and finally section 10 presents our conclusions and policy 
recommendations. 
 
 
2. NSI and its Potential Mitigating Impact on Recession: A Conceptual 
Framework 
A system of innovation, in general, brings together all the significant economic, 
social, political, organisational, institutional and other factors and their 
interactions and influence the development, diffusion, and application of 
innovations. Though interest in the innovation systems approach have grown 
since the 1980s, its origin dates back to the nineteenth century catch up 
aspirations of economies like that of Germany with Britain. 
 
Although Friedrich List (1856) and his concept national production system may 
be seen as the historical origin of the national system of innovation (Freeman, 
1995), according to Bengt-Åke Lundvall, the modern version of the concept 
appeared first in an unpublished contribution to OECD by Freeman (1982). 
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Since then, it has evolved over the years (e.g. Freeman, 1987, 1995; Lundvall, 
1988, 1992, 2007; Nelson, 1993; and Edquist, 1997). Although NSI concept was 
used mainly in the context of developed economies, increasingly it began to be 
used to study developing countries (e.g. Cimoli, 2000); Intarakumnerd and 
Chaaminade, 2007). Also, there have been attempts to broaden NSI approach to 
study the problems and challenges of development and underdevelopment (e.g. 
Muchie et al., 2003). Thus, NSI provides the conceptual approach or framework 
for studying both developed and developing economies at various stages of 
development. We adopt NSI conceptual framework to investigate the degree to 
which different BRICS countries with differing levels of NSI strength and 
weakness cope in mitigating some of the adverse impacts of the recession. This 
is done by first identifying those elements of NSI which could have significant 
impact on the effectiveness of recession. 
 
Lundvall (2007, p. 102) argued that NSI concept can be employed at two levels: 
(i) the ‘core’ - “firms in interaction with other firms and with the knowledge 
infrastructure” including universities; and (ii) ‘wider setting’ that includes 
“national education systems, labour markets, financial markets, intellectual 
property rights, competition in product markets and welfare regimes”. In the 
‘wider setting’ the government plays a major role in a number of ways. We 
would argue that in the narrow sense NSI involves a system of interaction of a 
wide variety of public and/ or private firms with other institutions such as 
universities, and government agencies -- all working together towards attaining 
the production and diffusion of knowledge and science, technology, and 
innovation within the boundaries of legally recognised states. The form of the 
interaction can take both technical and non-technical dimensions. It could be 
organisational, institutional, commercial, physical, human, mental, legal, social, 
and financial interactions. The broader goal of such interactions is the socio-
economic development, regulation, and support for new science, technology, 
innovation within the country by dealing with and responding to both internal 
and external challenges. For this study, we employ the NSI concept in its wider 
setting. 
 
The NSI has four key sets of elements: 1. The first set Conceptual Framing 
involves the ideas and policies that frame the overall scope or possible set of 
interactions of politics, economics and knowledge. The behaviour and 
interactions are often shaped by sets of common habits, norms, routines, 
established practices, rules, or laws. 2. The second set involves Institutions, 
Technologies, and Knowledge and their co-evolution which enable 
implementation of the conceptual framing and policies selected above (the first 
set) and to build an efficient innovation system. 3. The third set involves the 
means provided to the institutions (second set) for realising the goals set (first 
set), that is, various incentives such as financial and social rewards. This is vital 
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to foster appropriate incentive system. If the incentive system is inappropriate or 
fails to command wider acceptance, the opportunity to organise robust NSI and 
achieve measureable results will be put in jeopardy. 4. The fourth set highlights 
the overall efficiency of the environment for learning in terms of 
implementation, monitoring, review, and feedback involving the above three 
sets. The learning outcomes can be different such as transformative, adaptive, 
corrective, modifying, evolutionary, and so on. This can also be negative. The 
relationship between these four sets of elements that constitute NSI are 
illustrated by Figure 1 (see the left hand side).  
 
Figure 1: Four Major Sets of Elements of National System of Innovation (NSI) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
NSI
Strong/ W eak Linkages between
 Different Elements Resulting in:
1. Well Developed NSI, or  
2. Learning/ Transition NSI, or 
3. Nascent/ Very Weak NSI 
 Elements Set 1:
Conceptual Framing
How economics and politics are 
co-governed and/or co-evolved.
Articulating the interaction among 
Government action, Industrial 
production, and Knowledge creation. 
 Elements Set 2:
  Institutions, Industry, Technologies, 
and Knowledge
Need strong interaction, linkages, 
synergies, and co-ordination between 
these to achieve more efficient 
innovation system. 
  Elements Set 4: 
Implementation/
 Learning Outcomes and Changes 
Implementation of policies and 
programs should include feedback. 
Ability to learn and take corrective 
measures are imperative. 
Learning outcomes could lead to 
different types of socio-economic 
changes
  Elements Set 3:
 Incentives,  Investment and 
Infrastructure: 
These  lead to co-evolutionary dynamics 
between Institution, Technology, and 
Knowledge production by linking 
economic and non-economic agents.
Com ponents of Elem ent Set - 2
Institutions and Relations
Domestic market/ Structure,
Domestic and Foreign Firms, 
Universities, Public R&D 
Organizations, Financial Institutions, 
University-Public R&D Relations, 
Transnational Networks.
Com ponents of Elem ent Set - 2
Industry, Technologies and 
Knowledge
Different/ Diversified industrial 
sectors, Education system, Human 
resources development, and Skills/ 
Labor flexibility and mobility. 
Com ponents of Elem ent Set - 3
Incentives
Economic and Regulatory Incentives: Export 
related, Trade and Tax policies, Return on 
R&D investment, Appropriability through 
Intellectual Property, Competitive Market and 
Pricing.
Economic and Regulatory Incentives:  Public 
funding with Intellectual Property, i. e. 
Industry-Government research partnership, 
Regulatory standards to drive innovations.
Com ponents of Elem ent Set - 3
Investment &  Infrastructure
 Public & Private Investment, Venture Capital, and 
Foreign Direct Investment.
Macro-economic & Fiscal Policy, Science and 
Technology Policy, Intellectual Property Rights 
(IPR), Government R&D support, ICT 
Infrastructure.
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Table 1: Some Major Components of NSI that Could have Mitigating Impact on 
Recession 
Components of NSI that could Impact on 
Recession 
Related to the Elements of NSI 
(As shown in Figure 1) 
1. The general investment climate and 
economic policy framework:  
 
(a)Macroeconomic and social stability 
(b) National fiscal policy regime 
(c) Foreign debt 
(d) Inflation 
(e) Interest rate, and Exchange rate  
(f) Regulatory regime such as trade and 
tax policies 
(g) Nature and role of FDI  
 
NSI Elements Set 1 (overall political and 
economic setting/ direction), and Set 3 and 
their components: 
Investment & Infrastructure, and Incentives 
2. Market, per capita income, domestic 
savings:  
 
(a) Domestic market size / structure 
(b) Links to regional and global markets 
(c) Domestic savings growth 
 
NSI Elements Sets 2 and components: 
Institutions and Relations  
3. Industrial structure:  
 
(a) Presence of diverse industrial 
structure  
(b) Strength of domestic firms 
(c) Presence and role of foreign firms 
(d) Links to foreign companies/ foreign 
financial market 
 
NSI Elements Sets 2 and Set 3 and 
components:  
Institutions, Investment & Infrastructure, and 
Incentives 
4. Financial Institutions: 
(a) Banking sector 
(b) Role and effectiveness of the Central 
Bank 
(c) Links to foreign financial market 
 
NSI Elements Set 2 and components: 
Institutions, Industry Sectors, Technologies 
and Knowledge 
5. Foreign Trade: 
 
(a) Nature of exports/ Imports 
(b) Export markets (Destinations) 
(c) Dependence on commodity exports 
 
NSI Elements Set 2 and Set 3 and 
components: 
Industry, Technologies and Knowledge; and 
Incentives 
6. Skills, R&D, and Technology 
development 
(a) Investment in education and skills 
(human resources) development 
(b) Investment in R&D 
NSI Elements Set 2 and Set 3 and 
components: Industry, Technologies and 
Knowledge; and Incentives 
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1 .  G e n e r a l  i n v e s t m e n t  
c l i m a t e  a n d  e c o n o m i c  p o l i c y  
f r a m e w o r k :  
M a c r o e c o n o m i c  a n d  s o c i a l  
s t a b i l i t y
N a t i o n a l  f i s c a l  p o l i c y  r e g i m e
F o r e i g n  d e b t
In f l a t i o n
In t e r e s t  a n d  E x c h a n g e  r a t e s  
R e g u l a t o r y  r e g i m e  s u c h  a s  
t r a d e  a n d  t a x  p o l i c i e s
N a t u r e  a n d  r o l e  o f  F D I 
N S I
5  S e t s  o f  M a j o r  C o m p o n e n t s  o f  N I S  t h a t  c o u ld  h a v e  M it ig a t in g  I m p a c t  o n  R e c e s s io n  
D e v e l o p e d / A d v a n c e d  N S I s
( e . g .  U S ,  E U ,  a n d  J a p a n  &  N e w l y  
In d u s t r i a l i z e d  A s i a n  E c o n o m i e s  -  
K o r e a ,  T a i w a n ,  S i n g a p o r e ,  H o n g  
K o n g )
L e a r n i n g /  T r a n s i t i o n  N S I s
( B R IC S s  a n d  O t h e r  E m e r g i n g  
E c o n o m i e s  -  e . g .  M a l a ys i a ,  
T h a i l a n d  )
N a s c e n t /  W e a k  N S I s
( S u b -S a h a r a n  A f r i c a ,  L a t i n  
A m e r i c a ,  S o u t h  A s i a )
2 .  M a r k e t ,  p e r  c a p i t a  
i n c o m e ,   d o m e s t i c  s a v i n g s :  
D o m e s t i c  m a r k e t  s i z e  /  
s t r u c t u r e
L i n k s  t o  r e g i o n a l  a n d  g l o b a l  
m a r k e t s
D o m e s t i c  s a v i n g s
G r o w t h
3 .  I n d u s t r i a l  s t r u c t u r e :  
P r e s e n c e  o f  d i v e r s e  i n d u s t r i a l  
s t r u c t u r e  
S t r e n g t h  o f  d o m e s t i c  f i r m s
P r e s e n c e  a n d  r o l e  o f  fo r e i g n  
f i r m s
L i n k s  t o  fo r e i g n  c o m p a n i e s /  
fo r e i g n  f i n a n c i a l  m a r k e t
 
4 .  F i n a n c i a l  I n s t i t u t i o n s :
B a n k i n g  s e c t o r
R o l e  a n d  e f fe c t i v e n e s s  o f  t h e  
C e n t r a l  B a n k
L i n k s  t o  fo r e i g n  f i n a n c i a l  m a r k e t
5 .  F o r e i g n  T r a d e :
N a t u r e  o f  e x p o r t s
&  i m p o r t s
E x p o r t  m a r k e t s  ( D e s t i n a t i o n s )
D e p e n d e n c e  o n  c o m m o d i t y  
e x p o r t s
 N S I  T y p e s  a n d  I m p a c t s  
S tr o n g ,  o r  R e la t iv e ly s t r o n g  o r  W e a k  m itig a t in g  im p a c t  o n  r e c e s s io n .
( D e p e n d i n g  o n  t h e  i n t e r a c t i o n s  a n d  l i n k a g e s  b e t w e e n  t h e s e  N S I 
c o m p o n e n t s )
6 .  S k i l l s ,  R & D ,  &  T e c h n o l o g y  
D e v e l o p m e n t :
In v e s t m e n t  i n  s k i l l s  &  e d u c a t i o n
In v e s t m e n t  i n  R & D
F ig u r e  2 :  S t r e n g t h  o f  N a t io n a l S y s t e m  o f  I n n o v a t io n  a n d  i t s  M it ig a t in g  I m p a c t  o n  
R e c e s s io n :  A  C o n c e p t u a l F r a m e w o rk
 
 
 
In Figure 1 (see on right hand side), we elaborate Set 2 (Institutions, Industry, 
Technologies and Knowledge), and Set 3 (Incentives, Investment and 
Infrastructure) further into individual components or sub-elements, as these are 
relevant to making linkages and relations between NSI and recession. The strong 
presence and interaction and linkages between various institutions, industrial 
sectors, technologies, knowledge, incentives, investment, and infrastructure 
determine the higher or relatively stronger or weaker level of functioning of a 
particular NSI. We would argue that the relative strength of an NSI can have a 
mitigating impact on recession. We identified 6 sets of components (sub-
elements) of NSI that could have significant mitigating impact on recession. 
These are shown in Table 1. These are part of 4 sets of major NSI elements that 
are illustrated in Figure 1. These NSI elements and components of these 
elements are largely derived from the Word Investment Reports published by the 
UNCTAD (e.g. 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005) and the NSI literature. 
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Figure 2 presents a conceptual framework linking 6 sets of NSI components or 
sub-elements (which are identified from the 4 major sets of NSI elements as 
shown in Figure 1) to the mitigating impact of NSI on recession. The degree of 
strength of these NSI components and interaction between them will make an 
NSI as either developed, transition/ learning, or nascent/ weaker. The important 
issue we are highlighting here is that although there are many similarities 
between systems of innovation, there are also differences related to the stage of 
development, characteristics of NSI evolution, path dependency, institutions, 
laws, policies, and incentives. These in turn are likely to have either strong, 
relatively strong or weak mitigating impact on recession. That is, if a country 
has a well functioning or strong 6 sets of NSI components identified in Table 1 
and Figure 2, it is likely to witness high mitigating impact on recession. On the 
other hand, if a country has a non-functioning or weak 6 sets of NSI 
components, it is likely to witness no or little mitigating impact on recession. If 
a country has a relatively well functioning 6 sets of NSI components, then it is 
likely to have a relatively strong mitigating impact on recession.  
 
What we mean by mitigating capability is the ability of NSI to deal with and 
respond to unforeseen or foreseen crisis that could be induced internally or 
externally or by the combination of both domestic and internationals factors. 
The tendency is towards restricting or contraction of the economy due to 
changes in business cycle or recessionary down turn in economic activity. 
Therefore the key to see mitigating capability is how NSI components respond 
and deal with this challenge. So, we correlate the NSI components to the 
recessionary downturn to explore whether they can cope or not. This is done by 
using indicative and descriptive data. For example, we take the GDP and see 
whether they have contracted or is it still growing, or reduced severely or 
slightly. We try to show through this the underlying economic strength or 
weakness or relative strength or weakness of the NSI to deal with the 
recessionary crisis. 
 
We are contributing by adding to the existing body of NSI literature by linking 
NSI framework to its potential mitigating impact on recession in national 
economies. The way we did this theoretically is first to identify the four sets of 
elements that constitutes the NSI and then identify 6 sub-elements or 
components of NSI (as shown in Figure 1; and Table 1) and try to conceptualize 
whether and how weak or strong they can have mitigating impact on recession. 
In actual fact we are looking for making a paradigm change of the way 
economic development and recession can be appreciated by employing NSI 
framework.  
 
To illustrate this empirically we analyse NSIs of selected Asian economies – 
South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, Thailand, Bangladesh and Nepal, using 
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descriptive and secondary data. These countries were selected according to the 
classification of countries in IMF-World Economic Outlook -2010. South Korea 
and Taiwan are classified as ‘Other advanced economies’ and ‘Newly 
industrialized Asian economies’ sub groups under the major group ‘Advanced 
Economies’. Malaysia is classified as ‘Net Creditor’ sub group, Thailand as ‘Net 
debtor (official external financing)’ sub group, and Bangladesh and Nepal are 
classified as ‘Net debtor (experience with debt serving)’ sub group, under the 
‘Emerging and Developing Economies’ major group. In other words, IMF 
country classifications are used to select our cases to represent the types of NSIs 
illustrated in the conceptual framework. That is, South Korea and Taiwan 
represents developed NSI, Malaysia and Thailand are Transitional NSIs, and 
Bangladesh and Nepal represent weak or nascent NSIs. 
 
In the following sections the potential mitigating impact of NSIs of these 
economies on recession will be analysed employing the conceptual framework 
illustrated by Figure 2. 
 
 
3. The Case of South Korea 
Korean economy fully open to trade and financial flows and the government is 
committed to reducing regulatory restrictions on business operations, increasing 
transparency in government – business relations and reducing corporate tax. But 
the organised labour is increasingly forceful in their demands in recent years.  
 
Table 2 provides the main economic indicators for South Korea between 2000 
and 2009. It is clear that the global recession has affected the real GDP growth 
and budget balance, increased the external debt, weakened its national currency 
against the US$, and particularly affected its exports and imports in 2008 and 
2009. 
 
In 2008 the shares of GDP by different sectors were: agriculture -3%, industry - 
39.4%, and services: 57.6% (estimates). In 2007, the agriculture employed 7.2% 
of the workforce, the industry - 25.1%, and the services - 67.7% (estimates). 
South Koreas exports in 2008 and 2009 amounted to US$433.5b and $355.1b 
(estimate), respectively. The exports included: semiconductors, wireless 
telecommunications equipment, motor vehicles, computers, steel, ships, and 
petrochemicals. In 2008, the shares of its export partners were: China 21.5%, US 
10.9%, Japan 6.6%, Hong Kong 4.6% (2008). South Koreas imports in 2008 and 
2009 amounted to US$427.4b and $313.4b (estimate), respectively. The imports 
included: machinery, electronics and electronic equipment, oil, steel, transport 
equipment, organic chemicals, and plastics. In 2008, shares of its import 
partners were: China 17.7%, Japan 14%, US 8.9%, Saudi Arabia 7.8%, UAE 
4.4%, Australia 4.1% (2008) (CIA, 2009). 
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Table 2: South Korea: Main Economic Indicators 
Indicators 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008* 2009*+
Real GDP Growth Rates (%) 8.5 3.8 7.0 3.1 4.7 4.2 5.1 5.0 2.2 -1.8 
Gross Domestic Savings 
Rates (% of GDP) 
33.9 31.9 31.4 33.0 35.0 33.2 31.5 30.8 30.7 28.8 
Gross Domestic Investment 
Rates (% of GDP) 
31.0 29.3 29.1 30.0 30.4 30.1 29.8 29.4 31.4 25.5 
Inflation Rates (%) 2.3 4.1 2.8 3.5 3.6 2.8 2.2 2.5 4.3 3.5 
Budget Balance (% of GDP) 1.1 1.2 3.3 1.1 0.7 0.4 0.4 3.8 1.2 -2.9 
Current Account Balance  
(% of GDP) 
2.4 1.7 1.0 2.0 4.1 1.9 0.6 0.6 -6.4 25.6 
Change in Money Supply (%) 25.4 13.2 11.0 6.7 -0.6 3.1 4.4 0.3 9.1 7.2 
Total External Debt (%GDP)* -- -- -- -- -- 22.2 27.3 36.5 40.9 48.0 
Exchange Rate (per US$, 
avg.)* 
-- -- -- -- 1 146 1 024 955 929 1 100 1 317 
Gross Foreign Reserves 
(US$b)* 
-- -- -- -- 199.0 210.3 238.9 262.1 201.1 231.7 
Merchandise Export Growth 
Rates (%) 
19.9 -12.7 8.0 19.3 31.0 12.0 14.4 14.1 14.3 -20.3 
Merchandise Import Growth 
Rates (%) 
34.0 -12.1 7.8 17.6 25.5 16.4 18.4 15.3 21.8 -28.7 
Source: ESCAP, Economic and Social Survey of Asia and the Pacific 2009, Tables 1 to 9, pp. 174-182, New York: United Nations. 
* Figures from IMF (2009c), Republic of Korea: 2009 Article IV Consultation-Staff Report, Washington D.C: IMF; + Projections. 
 
Korea was affected by the global financial crisis by the last quarter of 2008. It 
witnessed a faster capital out flow than during the 1997-98 crisis which led to 
sharply lower asset prices, and dislocations in money markets, a record slump in 
exports, and a drop in domestic demand. Korean domestic banks and foreign 
banks in the country faced big reduction in their credit lines resulting in 
reduction in capital account (6% of GDP). The national currency – Won and 
equity markets declined by 30% and shortage of dollar led to problems in 
domestic money markets (IMF, 2009c).  
 
Because of these the economy contracted by 5.1% in the last quarter of 2008 
compared to that of 2007 (IMF, 2009e). The government announced a number 
of policy measures to face the impact of global recession. These included: (i) 
fiscal support measures equivalent to around 4% of GDP to promote fiscal 
expenditure expansion and tax reduction; (ii) allocated US$55b in foreign 
exchange reserves to provide swaps or loans to banks and trade related 
businesses; (iii) the Bank of Korea (BOK) cut interest rates; (iv) set up bank 
recapitalization fund and toxic asset fund to shield the banking sector from the 
global crisis and prevent serious deleveraging; (v) programmes such as ‘ Green 
New Deal Job Creation Plan’ to create 960, 000 jobs in four years (140, 00 jobs 
in 2009) by providing better training; (vi) welfare support to low income and 
disadvantaged sections; (vii) financial support for SMEs; and (viii) programmes 
to build energy saving and carbon reduction economy (IMF, 2009e; ESCAP, 
2009, p.100).  
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According to IMF (2009e) these measures helped to ward off serious impacts of 
the global crisis in the following ways: (i) exchange rate devaluation helped to 
avoid deflationary pressures; (ii) the weak national currency –Won redirected 
domestic demand from imports to domestic production; (iii) the weak Won also 
sustained core inflation; (iv) external defaults and a credit crunch have been 
avoided; (v) helped bank credit to grow at healthy level; (vi) helped to increase 
government and private consumptions, and construction investment; and (vii) 
helped to stabilise and recover exports, industrial production, and the service 
sector activities. However, IMF opined that as domestic demand is constrained 
by highly leveraged households and SMEs, full recovery by the Korean 
economy depends on external demands and global financial conditions.  
 
After a staff visit in December 2009, the IMF stated: “The Korean economy has 
bounced back impressively from the unprecedented capital outflows and 
dramatic collapse in export demand late last year” and concluded that various 
fiscal, monetary, and financial policy measures taken by the government has 
worked by keeping the banks adequately capitalized and maintaining stable 
conditions in financial markets (IMF, 2009f). 
 
To recapitulate, because of the robustness of South Korea’s financial sector and 
government’s stimulus package has maintained the stability of the banking 
sector and financial markets in the face of serious global financial crisis, 
although the national currency and the equity market experienced negative 
impact. Also, the government has invested in maintaining the high skilled work 
force, creating large number of jobs, and social cohesion. But its predominantly 
export driven economy suffered when it exports were hit hard particularly when 
demands in the US dropped. In other words, the impact of global recession on 
South Korea appears to be influenced by the national context, that is, its NSI. 
 
4. The Case of Taiwan 
Taiwan is one of the high performance countries according to different 
categories of indicators: Investment climate - ranked 5th out of 50 countries 
surveyed (2009); Global competitiveness - 17th out of 134 countries (2008); 
Business Environment – 16th out of 82 surveyed (2009); IT industry 
competitiveness – 2nd out of 66 (2008); ICT development – 25th out of 154 
(2009); E-government performance – 2nd out of 198 (2008); and Network 
readiness – 13th out of 134 (2009) (Government Information office-Taiwan, 
2009a, ch.7). Taiwan’s economy consists of three major sectors: Agriculture, 
Goods producing industry, and Services. In 1987 they contributed to the GDP 
5.18%, 44.49%, and 50.3%, respectively. By 2008, their shares to GDP have 
changed to: Agriculture (employing 5.14% of work force) – 1.69%, Goods 
producing industry (employing 36.84% of work force) – 25.04%, and Services 
(employing 58.02% of work force) – 73.27%. During this period while the 
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shares of Agriculture and Goods producing sectors declined significantly, that of 
Services has increased by 23%. In 2008, only annual change in GDP share (%) 
of the Goods producing industry was negative (-2.73%) (Government 
Information office-Taiwan, 2009, ch. 9).  
 
To manage and ward of serious problems caused by the global financial crisis 
the government has announced a series of policy measures. These included: (i) 
announcement of full guarantee of all saving deposits and adoption of loose 
monetary policy to increase banks’ liquidity (October 2008); (ii) establishment 
of special task force to support business operations with government assistance; 
(iii) mechanisms for debt negotiations between banks and borrowers; (iv) 
various financial measures to help small and medium enterprises (SMEs); (v) 
continuation of preferential home loan programmes; (vi) various measures to 
stimulate domestic demand and consumption such as issuing of consumption 
vouchers, construction of local infrastructure, cultivating high grade manpower 
and schooling safety net through investment in public works, subsidy for 
purchasing energy saving and low carbon emitting household appliances, and 
subsidy for low income workers who are main breadwinners (vii) special 
programmes to attract tourists from main land China, (viii) incentives to 
promote exports to main land China and emerging markets and also for imports 
from Taiwan; (ix) tax breaks and incentives to manufacturing and technical 
service firms, (x) reduction of vehicle tax to stimulate sales of new vehicles; and 
(xi) financial support for short-term skill development training programme in 
business enterprises during the work hours reduced under negotiation between 
the businesses and unions (CEPD, 2009).  
 
Table 3 provides major economic indicators which show consistent real GDP 
growth until 2007 and major drop in 2008 and 2009 which suggest significant 
negative impact of Global recession on the economy. The recession also appears 
to have some impact on gross domestic investment rate (% of GDP), inflation 
rate, current account balance, budget balance and growth of exports and imports. 
However, the GDP per capita and foreign exchange reserves were maintained at 
high levels. 
 
The impact of global recession was felt in Taiwan only from the second half of 
2008 and during 2007 and the first half of 2008 it remained relatively 
unaffected. It was because of its strong financial sector which had relatively low 
exposure to the global financial crisis triggered by the US financial institutions. 
However, because of Taiwan’s export markets such as the US and EU started 
experiencing severe recession by 2008, Taiwan’s exports fell sharply and the 
real GDP growth (based on constant 2001 prices) in the third and fourth quarters 
of 2008 dropped to -1.05% and -8.61%, respectively (Government Information 
office-Taiwan, 2009). 
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Table 3: Taiwan - Main Economic Indicators 
Indicators 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009* 2010* 
Real GDP Growth Rates (%) 6.2 4.2 4.8 5.7 0.1 -1.9** 4.7b
GDP per capita (US$’000s - at 
PPP) 
27.5 e 29.6 e 31.9 e 34.6 e 37.1e 39.4 41.5 
Gross Domestic Investment Rates 
(% of GDP) 
19.5 1.2 0.9** 1.9** -10.8** 1.5 3.1 
Inflation Rates (av; %) 1.6 2.3 0.6 1.8 3.5 -1.3 0.8 
Budget Balance (% of GDP) -2.4 -1.6 -0.7 -0.4 -1.3e -5.2 -5.1 
Current Account Balance  
(% of GDP) 
5.7 4.9 7.2 8.6 6.3 9.6 9.4 
 Lending Rate (av; %) 3.5 3.8 4.1 4.3 4.2 3.2 3.6 
Exchange rate NT$=US$ (av) 33.4 32.2 32.5 32.8 31.5 34.1 34.1 
Foreign exchange reserves (US$b) 246.5 257.9 270.8 275.0 282.3 285.1 291.6 
Change in Money Supply (%) 7.4 6.6 5.3 0.9 4.6 e 4.1 5.7 
Merchandise Export Growth Rates 
(%)** 
21.1 8.8 12.9 10.1 3.6 -34.3a  32.6 c 
Merchandise Import Growth Rates 
(%)** 
31.8 8.2 11.0 8.2 9.8 -41.2a 42.8 c 
Source: Economic Intelligence Unit (EIU) (2008), Country Report – Taiwan, London: EIU; Council for Economic Planning 
and Development (CEPD) – Taiwan (2009, 2010), Taiwan’s Economic Situation and Outlook, Available at: 
http://www.cepd.gov.tw/encontent/m1.aspx?sNo=0001444&key=&ex=%20&ic=&cd= (Accessed on 27 March 2010). 
* Forecasts by EIU; e -Estimates by EIU; ** Figures from CEPD; a - until April 2009; b - estimates by CEPD; c – February 
2010 figures. 
 
 
According to the Government of Taiwan, the initial impact of global recession 
Taiwan’s economy included: (i) Taiwan Stock Exchange’s (TWSE) benchmark 
TAIEX index lost about 40 percent of its value during the second half of 2008; 
(ii) unemployment increased to 5.03% at the end of 2008 and to 6.07% in July 
2009 (compared to an average 4.14% unemployment rate in 2008); (iii) among 
employed workers (excluding the self-employed and workers in the agricultural 
sector), total monthly working hours and wages decreased significantly and on 
average, over the period from January to May 2009, they worked 10 hours less 
and received 7.4%, or about US$115, less wages per month as compared with 
the same five-month period in 2008; (iv) employees in the manufacturing sector 
were affected even more than others, as they worked 17.8 hours less and 
received 14.9% less wages per month than during the same period in 2008; and 
(v) exports witnessed a big drop between September to December 2008 (average 
monthly growth was -19.1%), and in December alone, exports dropped 41.9% 
(Government Information office-Taiwan, 2009, ch. 9).  
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Table 4: Taiwan - Share of Exports and Imports of the Major Trading partners 
Year EXPORTS IMPORTS 
US Japan Europe China 
(Incl. 
Hong 
Kong)
ASEAN 6 US Japan Middle 
East 
China 
(Incl. 
Hong 
Kong) 
ASEAN 6 
2002 18.6 8.5 15.1 10.1 9.8 14.9 26.6 5.2 8.3 13.3 
2008 12.0 6.9 11.7 39.0 15.0 10.9 19.3 16.2 13.7 10.7 
2009 11.6 7.1 11.1 41.1 14.8 10.4 20.8 12.99 14.7 11.3 
Changes in TWO-way Trade with Major Trading Partners (year-on-year %) 
2006 11.2 7.9 10.6 14.8 13.8 7.1 0.5 30.1 20.1 10.4 
2007 -0.9 -2.2 9.7 12.6 16.7 17.0 -0.7 12.0 11.9 1.7 
2008 -4.0 10.2 4.6 -0.8 7.3 -0.7 1.3 40.3 10.3 8.4 
2009 -23.5 -17.4 -24.6 -15.9 -21.5 -31.0 -22.1 -42.1 -22.3 -22.8 
2010 
Jan-
Feb 
17.9 22.4 37.0 85.2 65.5 73.3 71.1 100.7 75.7 89.0 
Source: Council for Economic Planning and Development (CEPD) – Taiwan (2009, 2010), Taiwan’s Economic Situation and 
Outlook; Available at: http://www.cepd.gov.tw/encontent/m1.aspx?sNo=0001444&key=&ex=%20&ic=&cd= (Accessed on 
27 March 2010). 
 
Table 4 shows the changes in the share of exports and imports of the major 
trading partners of Taiwan between 2002 and 2009. It is very clear that by 2009, 
China (including Hong Kong) has replaced the US which was the leading export 
market in 2002 and emerged as the predominant export market with 41%. Also, 
while the share of Japan and Europe declined, the share of ASEAN has 
increased significantly during the same period. Again in the area of imports, 
only China has increased its share among its traditional import partners, other 
than Middle East (which appears to have increased its share mainly because of 
high oil import bill).  
 
It appears that global recession did not affect significantly Taiwan’s investment 
in R&D and education. Taiwan’s R&D investment increased from 2.57% of 
GDP in 2007 to 2.77% in 2008. Similarly, the investment in education increased 
from 20% of GDP in 2005 to 21% in 2008. Furthermore, in response to the 
global recession, the government announced in January 2009 that it would 
provide up to NT$13 billion (US$412.4 million) to assist students from families 
in financial distress, that to support students at all levels of education whose 
parents have been out of work involuntarily for at least one month. In September 
2008 the government also started the Night Angel Illumination Program to 
provide financial support elementary school students from low-income, students 
without parents, and those from single-parent families. Over 10,000 students 
received support from this programme in 2008 and 2009. The programme also 
received support from the private sector (Government Information office-
Taiwan, 2009, ch. 17). 
 
By the last quarter of 2009 Taiwan has come out of recession as its GDP has 
registered 9.2% growth, which was the strongest since 2004 (The Straight 
Times, 23 February 2010, p. B14.).  
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To summarise, the impact of global recession on Taiwan appears to be 
influenced by the national context, that is, its NSI. While its strong financial 
sector has helped it to mitigate serious fallout from the crisis created by the 
financial institutions in the western countries, its predominant reliance on export 
driven growth has eventually has resulted in serious impact. However, trends in 
exports and imports suggests that Taiwan’s dynamic NSI and its neighbourhood 
that includes China, Japan and ASEAN appear to have helped it to recover from 
the impact of global recession faster than expected. 
 
 
5. The Case of Malaysia 
Malaysia is one of the members of the Association of South-East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), which is endowed with rich natural resources. It has been one of the 
more politically stable countries in the region. Malaysia has become an 
advanced economy, as it has witnessed rapid growth in the 1990s until the Asian 
financial crisis in 1997-98. Although it was not seriously affected by the crisis, it 
has slowed down its growth. However, it sustained its growth and in 2007, its 
GDP per capita (PPP basis) was the seventh in Asia. Malaysia’s growth was 
achieved through attracting significant flow of FDI, large expansion of its labour 
force and capital stock. China has emerged an important trade partner of 
Malaysia since it joined the WTO in 2001. Malaysia has a large ethnic Chinese 
population which is likely to help deepen the trade relationship with China. 
Although Malaysia boasts of relatively well educated and English speaking 
workforce, its productivity levels are low compared to the newly industrialised 
Asian economies such as Korea and Singapore and suffers from some 
inadequacies and constraints such as limited access to higher education and low 
skill level. As the country’s economy is dependent on export oriented growth, it 
has been investing in developing a good physical infrastructure (EIU, 2009b).  
 
The contributions to GDP by different sectors in 2009 (estimate) were: 
agriculture - 10.1% ; industry: 42.3%; services: 47.6%. The agriculture products 
included: rubber, palm oil, cocoa, rice, timber, coconuts, and pepper. The 
industry included: rubber and oil palm processing and manufacturing, light 
manufacturing, electronics, tin mining and smelting, logging and timber 
processing, petroleum production and refining, and agriculture processing. 
Malaysia exported electronic equipment, petroleum and liquefied natural gas, 
wood and wood products, palm oil, rubber, textiles, and chemicals. Its export 
partners included (2009 estimate): Singapore 13.9%, China 12.2%, US 10.9%, 
Japan 9.8%, Thailand 5.4%, and Hong Kong 5.2%. Malaysia’s imports included: 
electronics, machinery, petroleum products, plastics, vehicles, iron and steel 
products, and chemicals. Its import partners included (2009 estimate): China 
13.9%, Japan 12.5%, US 11.2%, Singapore 11.1%, Thailand 6%, Indonesia 
5.3%, South Korea 4.6%, Germany 4.2%, and Taiwan 4.2% (CIA, 2009). 
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The Asian financial crisis in 1997-98 has spurred Malaysia to strengthen its 
financial and banking sector by introducing “robust prudential regulation and 
supervision framework” , which helped to ensure that there is ‘virtually no toxic 
assets” in its financial system (IMF, 2009i, p.1). It opened up its economy 
gradually since the early 1990s, starting with manufacturing sector first and 
progressing to the services and allowing foreign equity up to 49% at first and 
progressively raising it to 100%. Malaysia also rationalised its financial sector 
by reducing the number of banks from 70 to just 9 and building their capacity to 
compete before opening the sector fully (IMF, 2009i). The financial sector is 
dominated by commercial banks. In 2009 (March), there were 39 commercial 
banks (9 domestic, 13 foreign owned, 11 domestic Islamic banks, and 8 foreign 
Islamic banks) with total assets of US$1.3trn. The global financial crisis did not 
affect the 9 Malaysian bank’s assets significantly and they escaped serious 
negative impact due to sufficient liquidity, strong capital ratios and limited 
foreign exposure. The financial services in industry are playing an important 
role in Malaysia’s economic growth. It accounted for 8% of its GDP and 2% of 
total employment.  Malaysia’s financial asset base is equivalent to 512% of 
GDP compared to 500% in China and about 300% in Thailand. It emerged as 
the largest market for Islamic bonds (sukuk) with issuing of three quarter of 
global total of US$41b. Its stock market Bursa Malaysia is larger than other 
emerging bourses in South East Asia except Singapore. Since 2005, its national 
currency ringgit is traded against basket of currencies in a managed float regime 
and Malaysia has put a ban on offshore trading of the ringgit (EIU, 2009c).  
 
 
Table 5: Malaysia: Main Economic Indicators 
Indicators 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008e 2009*+
Real GDP Growth Rates (%) 8.9 0.5 5.4 5.8 6.8 5.3 5.8 6.3 4.6*p -4.5 
Per Capita GDP (US$ at 
ppp)^ 
-- -- -- -- 10 854 11 531 12 349 13 223 13 852 13 266 
Gross Domestic Savings 
Rates (% of GDP) 
46.1 41.8 42.0 42.5 43.4 42.8 43.2 42.2 41.8 -- 
Gross Domestic Investment 
Rates (% of GDP) 
26.9 24.4 24.8 22.8 23.0 20.0 20.9 21.9 19.8*p 20.8 
Inflation Rates (%) 1.5 1.4 1.8 1.0 1.5 3.0 3.6 2.0 5.4*p 0.9 
Lending Interest Rate (%)^ -- -- -- -- 6.0 6.1 6.6 6.3 5.9 5.3 
Foreign Exchange Rate (M$ 
= 1US$,av.) 
    3.80 3.79 3.67 3.44 3.33 3.62 
Budget Balance (% of GDP) -5.5 -5.2 -5.3 -5.0 -4.1 -3.6 -3.3 -3.2 -5.1 -- 
Current Account Balance  
(% of GDP) 
9.0 7.9 7.1 12.0 12.0 14.5 16.1 15.6 17.4*p 12.8 
Total External Debt  
(% of GDP)* 
-- -- -- -- 42.3 38.1 33.7 27.9 24.9 25.8 
Net Foreign Direct 
Investment 
(US$ b)* 
-- -- -- -- 2.6 1.0 0.0 -2.7 -0.1*p -2.3 
Net Foreign Direct 
Investment 
(as % of GDP)*  
-- -- -- -- 2.1 0.7 0.0 -1.4 0.0 -1.1 
Foreign Exchange Reserve -- -- -- -- 66.7 70.5 82.5 101.3 91.2 90.4 
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(US$ b)* 
Change in Money Supply 
(%) 
5.3 2.3 6.0 11.1 25.2 15.6 17.1 9.5 14.4 -- 
Merchandise Export Growth 
Rates (%) 
16.2 -10.4 6.9 11.3 20.8 11.5 13.4 9.6 11.5 
*p -13.1 
Merchandise Import Growth 
Rates (%) 
25.1 -10.0 8.2 4.4 26.4 9.2 14.7 12.0 6.8*p -9.0 
Source: ESCAP, Economic and Social Survey of Asia and the Pacific 2009, Tables 1 to 9, pp. 174-182, New York: United Nations. 
* IMF (2009), Malaysia: 2009 Article IV Consultation—Staff Report, Washington D.C.: IMF; ^ IMF (2009) Malaysia – Financial 
Services Report; e – Estimate; p – Preliminary; + Forecast 
 
Table 5 shows some main economic indicators of Malaysia for the period 2000 
to 2009. It is clear that from 2002 it has achieved a real growth rate of 5-6% 
until the global financial crisis in 2008. It has registered a high domestic saving 
rates over the years and increased consistently the Per capita GDP, but it has 
reduced significantly its external debt (from 42% to 24% of GDP), increased its 
foreign exchange reserve to about US$90-100b by 2008. It appears the foreign 
exchange rate was not affected significantly. Malaysia achieved export growth 
rate of 10% year on year until the global recession started to affect it in 2008. 
Malaysia’s import growth was less consistent ranging from 20% in 2004 to 12% 
in 2007. It is clear from the Table 5 that the global recession has affected both 
the exports and imports, and it also affected the inflation rate. In 2008, 
Malaysia’s trade with China (excluding Hong Kong) accounted for 9.5%, while 
Japan accounted for 10.8%, Singapore – 14.7%, and the US – 12.5% (EIU, 
2009c).  
 
Malaysia announced two economic stimulus packages totalling RM67b to help 
arrest the economy sliding into deep recession (Treasury of Malaysia, 2009). 
Initially, it was slow to announce a stimulus package to tackle the fallout of the 
global financial crisis compared to other countries. It announced a US$1.9b 
(RM7b) stimulus package, that is 1% of GDP, in 2008. It was aimed at 
supporting strategic industries and promoting high-speed broad band (RM1.9b), 
supporting small scale infrastructure development projects (RM1.6b), affordable 
housing (RM1.5b), educations and skills training programmes (RM1b), and 
public transport and military facilities (RM1b) (ESCAP, 2009, p.142). 
 
Malaysia has been badly affected by the global recession mainly because of the 
big drop in exports, record FDI outflows (US$27b in 2008), and increased 
volatility in the local financial market. This resulted in significant contraction of 
the economy in 2008-2009 (both the GDP and inflation have slowed). As total 
trade amounted to 200% of GDP, Malaysian economy was vulnerable to 
uncertainties in export markets. Exports fell by 23.4% in the first half of 2009 
compared with same period in 2008. Industrial production index dropped by 
12.7% compared with increase of 3.3% and total net FDI decreased to RM3.6b 
compared with RM19.7b during the same period. The domestic demand also 
slowed resulting in significant drop in imports. This left the current account 
 18
surplus nearly unchanged. The unemployment caused by the global recession 
was small, as businesses have shortened the workweeks rather than labour-
shedding. This helped to maintain consumer confidence. The Kuala Lumpur 
stock index fell by 30% between mid-2008 and March 2009 (but recovered by 
25% in April-May). However, money markets remained stable. The real 
effective exchange rate of the national currency against US$ depreciated by 
1.5% between October 2008 and March 2009 (IMF, 2009h; Treasury of 
Malaysia, 2009).  
 
Despite some major impacts of the global recession on its economy, Malaysia 
was expected to manage the impact of recession well because of a number of 
factors. These included: (i) good foreign exchange reserves although it declined 
by US$35b in the second half of 2008 (it stood at US$87b - 40% of GDP in June 
2009) ; (ii) good balance sheets of banks, corporate, and households; (iii) well 
diversified trade (both products and markets); (iv) strong central bank – Bank 
Negara Malaysia and its prudent policy regime; and (v) expected revival of 
international demand in 2010 (IMF, 2009h). Malaysia is taking the global 
recession as an opportunity to build a “new economic model” focused on 
services rather than manufacturing. That is, it intends to increase the service 
sector to 70% of GDP from 54% and establish “a knowledge-based economy” 
and reduce dependency on manufactured exports (manufactured goods now 
account for 72.5% of total exports against 14.8% for services). It also plans to 
shift manufacturing to more high-value-added in electronics, biotechnology and 
green technology. It also intends to reduce its dependence on Western export 
markets, such as the US, by diversifying its trade to South-east Asia, India, the 
Middle East and China (Burton, 2009). 
 
To recapitulate, due to the open economy of Malaysia and it dependence on 
exports and significant trade share with Western economies, the global recession 
has affected Malaysia significantly. However, it appears to have warded off 
deeper recession mainly due to its strengths in its banking and financial system, 
high national savings, large foreign exchange reserve, heavy investment in skills 
development, strong support to high value added manufacturing and services, 
measures to prevent large scale unemployment, and nurturing relatively high 
quality work force. 
 
 
6. The Case of Thailand 
Like Malaysia, Thailand is also one of the members of the ASEAN. Thailand 
has been open to investment and the investment climate is more favourable 
compared to China, India and other neighbouring countries except Malaysia. Its 
industrial base included: tourism, textiles and garments, agricultural processing, 
cement, electric appliances, computers and parts, integrated circuits, 
automobiles and automotive parts. Thailand is the world's second-largest 
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tungsten producer and third-largest tin producer. The GDP share of different 
sector in 2009 were (estimate): agriculture: 12.3%, industry: 44%, services: 
43.7% . The agriculture sector employed 42.4% of the total work force, the 
industry 19.7% and the services sector 37.9% (2008 estimate). Its exports 
included textiles and footwear, fishery products, rice, rubber, jewellery, 
automobiles, computers and electrical appliances. Major export destinations and 
their share of its exports included (2009) : US 10.9%, China 10.6%, Japan 
10.3%, Hong Kong 6.2%, Australia 5.6%, Malaysia 5% (estimated). Thailand’s 
major imports included: capital goods, intermediate goods and raw materials, 
consumer goods, and fuels. Major import partners and their share of its exports 
included (2009): Japan 18.7%, China 12.7%, Malaysia 6.4%, US 6.3%, UAE 
5%, Singapore 4.3%, South Korea 4.1% (estimated) (CIA, 2009).  
 
 
Table 6: Thailand: Main Economic Indicators 
Indicators 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008* 2009*+
Real GDP Growth Rates (%) 4.8 2.2 5.3 7.1 6.3 4.5 5.1 4.9 2.5** -2.8** 
GDP per capita (US$ at ppp)* -- -- -- -- 6 356 6 797 c 7 327 c 7 835 c 8 075 7 713 
Gross Domestic Savings 
Rates (% of GDP) 
32.5 31.4 31.7 32.0 31.7 31.0 32.3 33.9 33.3 c -- 
Gross Domestic Investment 
Rates (% of GDP) 
22.8 24.1 23.8 25.0 26.8 31.4 28.5 26.8 29.6 c -- 
Inflation Rates (%) 1.6 1.6 0.6 1.8 2.8 4.5 4.6 2.2 5.5** -0.9**
Budget Balance (% of GDP) -2.2 -2.4 -1.4 0.4 0.1 -0.6 1.1 -2.4 -1.2c -4.7 
Current Account Balance  
(% of GDP) 
7.6 4.4 3.7 3.4 1.7 -4.3 1.1 6.1 0.5** 8.1** 
Exchange rate Bt$=US$*  
(end period) 
-- -- -- -- 39.06 41.03 36.05 33.72 33.2** 34.3** 
Foreign exchange reserves* 
(US$b) 
-- --- -- -- 49.8 52.0 66.9 87.4 106.0 99.1 
External Debt (US$b)* -- -- -- -- 51.3 51.6 55.2 56.0 61.4 51.9 
Change in Money Supply (%) 4.9 5.5 3.8 13.9 5.3 5.6 6.8 2.5 5.3 -- 
Lending Interest Rate*  
(av, %) 
-- -- -- -- 5.5 5.8 7.4 7.1 7.0 6.6 
Foreign Direct Investment 
(US$b) 
-- -- -- -- 5.86 8.06 9.45 11.23 9.84 -- 
Merchandise Export Growth 
Rates (%) 
19.5 -7.1 4.8 18.2 21.6 15.0 16.9 17.2 5.1** -13.0**
Merchandise Import Growth 
Rates (%) 
31.3 -3.0 4.6 17.4 25.7 25.9 9.0 8.7 26.5** -25.9**
Origin of GDP (% real change) 
Agriculture  -- -- -- -- -2.4 -1.8 4.6 1.8 5.1 2.0 
Industry -- -- -- -- 7.9 5.4 5.7 5.7 3.4 -7.0 
Services -- -- -- -- 6.8 5.2 4.9 4.7 1.2 -2.9 
Source: ESCAP, Economic and Social Survey of Asia and the Pacific 2009, Tables 1 to 9, pp. 174-182, New York: United Nations. 
* Economic Intelligence Unit (2009), Country Report – Thailand, London: EIU, p. 17. ** Fiscal Policy Office, Ministry of Finance 
(Thailand), Thailand’s Economic Projections for 2009 and 2010, Available at: http://www2.mof.go.th/economic_report_detail.php?id=43 
(Accessed on 26 March 2010), 2009 figures are forecasts; + - Forecast; c - Estimate. 
 
Table 6 captures various economic indicators for Thailand from 2000 to 2009. 
Thailand was badly affected by 1997 economic crisis and it was slow to recover. 
However, since 2003 it witnessed significant real growth with average of 5.5% 
GDP growth until 2007. Between 2003 and 2005 the growth was driven by 
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domestic demand and then by a strong external sector. The gross domestic 
savings and investment have been significant and consistent. It is clear 
Thailand’s economic performance has been affected by the global recession in a 
number of areas such as inflation, budget balance, current account balance, and 
export and import growth. However, it appears to have avoided volatility in the 
exchange rate and interest rate. The foreign exchange reserves increased due to 
banks switching their assets abroad to domestic assets (IMF, 2009g), and 
avoided more external borrowings. The FDI fell and there was portfolio outflow. 
The percentage change of sectors’ contribution to the GDP illustrates that 
manufacturing and services have been consistently doing well from 2005 until 
the global recession in 2008-09. The performance by the agriculture sector has 
been strong relatively and has contributed significantly to the GDP. The 
financial and corporate sector remained robust overall.  
 
On the weak side, a number of problems are identified. There have been 
concerns about erosion of central bank’s independence in determining monetary 
policy. The physical infrastructure of the country remains relatively poor, 
despite government programmes to improve it. The education system requires 
reform, modernization of curriculum, increasing the number of students 
progressing to secondary and tertiary levels in order to modernize its workforce, 
which is “characterised by a low level of technical skills and also by poor 
foreign language skills” (EIU, 2009a, p.6). About 72% of employees identified 
proficiency in English as a major constraint. Thailand’s labour intensive export 
industries such as Textiles and Footwear are facing serious competition from 
Bangladesh, China, and its neighbourhood – Cambodia and Vietnam. Firms in 
Thailand are affected by three major constraints: heavy regulatory burden such 
as tax, labour, and customs regulations, shortage of skills, and poor 
infrastructure. Technological capability index (TCI) for all industries except 
three sectors – electronics & electrical appliances, machinery & equipment, and 
auto parts – are below average. The competitiveness of service and 
manufacturing firms are affected by lack of ICT capabilities (World Bank, 
2006).  
 
In response to the global financial crisis, in January 2009 the government 
announced a US$3.3b (116.7b - Baht) stimulus package to sustain economic 
stability by targeting free education programmes, job creation, low interest loans 
to farmers, lower water and electricity charges and support to low income 
families (ESCAP, 2009, p.142). In addition, in August 2009 the government 
approved a revised 1.06 trillion- baht, three-year investment program to revive 
the economy out of recession (Asia News, 24 March 2009). Other policy 
measures included: interest rate cuts, credit expansion guarantees for SMEs and 
exporters, and commitment to flexible exchange rate system (by Bank of 
Thailand). 
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The impacts of the global recession on Thailand is significant, particularly in the 
first quarter of 2009. These included: (i) private investment dropped sharply by 
16.4%; (ii) sales of commercial vehicles fell by 40%; (iii) import of capital 
goods (at constant price) fell by 21.7%; (iv) number of applications for new 
projects by investors to the Board of Investment fell by 29%; (v) manufacturing 
output contracted by 22.6%; (vi) output of electrical appliances fell by 21%; 
(vii) manufacturing employment dropped by 3.7% (overall employment grew 
due to some segments of service sector); (viii) exports dropped by 22.6% by 
May (year on year, a record contraction); (ix) exports dropped by 28% to the 
US, 28.9% to Japan, 21.3% to China; (x) imports dropped by 35% as domestic 
consumption dropped; (xi) capital goods imports fell by 13.6% and imports of 
raw materials and intermediate goods fell by 18.2% (EIU, 2009b); (xii) SET 
index fell by 45% as foreign investors exited and also equity market volatility 
rose significantly in 2008 (IMF 2009g).  
 
Since 2004 exports grew by 15 to 20% contributing about 65% of GDP. The 
global recession has affected the exports (which fell by 25.6% in January and 
24.5% in February 2009, excluding gold) and hit the economy hard (Asia News, 
24 March 2009). As a result, the economy contracted sharply by estimated -
2.85% in 2009 (originally it was forecast to be -3.5%). However due to the 
recovery by the last quarter of 2009, driven by expansionary fiscal measures by 
the government, revival in the private sector, and also revival by Thailand’s 
trade partners it is expected to recover to 3.5% in 2010 (Fiscal Policy Office, 
2009).  
 
To summarise, Thailand was affected significantly by the global recession in 
number of areas such as exports, manufacturing output, stock market, imports, 
and manufacturing employment. However, it has come out of recession by the 
last quarter of 2009 with upturn in exports and domestic demand stimulated by 
policy measures, and also due to good performance by the agriculture sector 
which performed strongly and appears to have provided a buffer against capital 
markets. Also, it appears that Thailand’s economy is relatively less exposed to 
the ailing world economies such as the US and EU and more diversified, which 
has helped to avoid falling into deeper recession. Overall, the nature and shape 
of impacts of the global economic recession on Thailand appears to have been 
largely influenced by the strengths and weaknesses of its national innovation 
system. 
 
 
7. The Case of Bangladesh 
The global financial crisis was expected to affect Bangladesh’s economy in 
three main areas: exports, remittances, and FDI. As the US and the EU are the 
major markets for its exports, the financial crisis in these markets are expected 
to impact on Bangladesh negatively. The remittances are made largely by its 
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unskilled and semi-skilled workers from Gulf Cooperation Council countries 
(construction sector). The rest of the remittances come from the USA, EU, 
Malaysia and Singapore. While the migration of unskilled and semiskilled 
workers increased from 38% to 52% between 2000 and 2008, the skilled 
workers and professionals migration declined from 45% to 33% and 5% to 
0.19% respectively. 
 
In April 2009, the government announced a stimulus package of Tk.32.24b to 
manage the impact of the global financial crisis. This included: (i) additional 
Tk.25.5b subsidy for power, fertilizer and export; (ii) TK.5b for recapitalization 
of state owned lenders; (iii) increasing cash incentives by 2.5% to selected 
industries (jute, leather, and frozen foods); (iv) relaxing the conditions for 
repayment of rescheduled loans for exporters and yarn producers; and (vi) 
continuing refinancing of the export credit of the commercial banks through the 
central bank – Bangladesh Bank (Ministry of Finance, 2009).  
 
Bangladesh Bank (BB) has initiated a number of measures to ward off the 
impact of global financial crisis such as: (i) imposing lending rate cap at 13% 
from second quarter of 2009; (ii) targeted lending programmes for listed 
commercial banks; (iii) extending 5% of loanable fund to agriculture sector at 
2% interest rate; (iv) rescheduling of loan instalments receivable for major 
export sectors affected by global recession; (v) establishing 3 rural branches for 
each new urban branch. BB also introduced an expansionary monetary policy 
mitigate the impact of global recession in the fiscal year 2010, that is, the target 
growth rate of broad money is 15.5% to accommodate 6% real GDP growth and 
6.5% inflation (World Bank, 2009).  
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Table 7: Bangladesh: Main Economic Indicators 
Indicators 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Real GDP Growth Rates (%) 5.9 5.3 4.4 5.3 6.3 6.0 6.6 6.4 6.2 5.9 
Gross Domestic Savings Rates 
(% of GDP) 
17.9 18.0 18.2 18.6 19.5 20.0 20.2 20.5 20.8 20.0 
Gross Domestic Investment 
Rates (% of GDP) 
23.0 23.1 23.2 23.4 24.0 24.5 24.7 24.3 24.2 24.2 
Inflation Rates (%) 2.8 1.9 2.8 4.4 5.8 6.5 7.2 7.2 9.9 6.7 
Budget Balance (% of GDP) -6.1 -5.2 -4.7 -4.2 -4.2 -4.4 -3.9 -3.7 -4.6 -3.0 
Current Account Balance  
(% of GDP) 
-1.0 -2.5 0.3 0.3 0.3 -0.9 1.3 1.4 0.9 2.8 
Change in Money Supply (%) 18.6 16.6 13.1 15.6 13.8 16.7 19.3 17.1 17.6 19.2 
Merchandise Export Growth 
Rates (%) 
8.3 12.4 -7.4 9.4 16.1 13.8 21.6 15.7 15.9 10.1 
Merchandise Import Growth 
Rates (%) 
4.6 11.5 -8.5 13.1 12.9 20.6 12.2 16.3 25.6 4.2 
Foreign Currency Reserves 
(US$ billion)* 
1.60 1.31 1.59 2.47 2.71 2.93 3.48 5.08 5.34 7.5+ 
Foreign Currency Reserves (as 
% of GDP)* 
3.4 2.8 3.3 4.8 4.8 4.9 5.6 7.4 6.8 -- 
Foreign Direct Investment 
(US$ million)* 
-- 550 391 376 385 776 743 760 748 941+ 
Foreign Direct Investment (as 
% of GDP)* 
-- 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.7 -- 
Source: ESCAP, Economic and Social Survey of Asia and the Pacific 2009, Tables 1 to 9, pp. 174-182, New York: United Nations. The 
World Bank (2009), Bangladesh Economic Update, September 2009, Washington D.C.: The World Bank. * These are figures for Fiscal 
years, starting from 1999-2000; Source: Ministry of Finance (2008), Bangladesh Economy and Global Financial Crisis: Policy Response, 
Dhaka: Government of Bangladesh. + Estimates 
 
Table 7 provides major macroeconomic indicators for Bangladesh. The GDP 
growth in Bangladesh started increasing since the 1990s and particularly it has 
been growing at the rate of about 6% from 2004. However, about 75% of the 
total population lives in rural areas and 44% of them live below poverty. Also 
the disparity between eastern and western regions has grown over the years. In 
the 1970s, the economy was based on agriculture which contributed 38% of 
GDP. This declined to 21% of GDP by 2007-2008 and the contribution of 
industrial sector increased from 15% to 30% during the same period. This was 
achieved by economic liberalization and opening up the economy for private 
investment. The investment to GDP reached over 24% and the government is 
aiming to reach 30% to achieve economic growth rate over 10%. The gross 
domestic savings has been 23-24% of GDP since 2001. The inflation rate has 
reached about 10% first time in 2007-08 due to international prices in fuel, 
fertilizer and food items and also due to natural disasters. The budget deficit has 
been kept at manageable limit (less than 5%) since 2002. Private sector credit 
(% GDP) grew from 3% in 1973-74 to 35% in 2006-07 and its share in the total 
domestic credit increased from 24% in 1973-74 to 74% in 2006-07. Market 
capitalization of all shares and debentures listed in Dhaka Stock Exchange has 
gone up from 8.7% of GDP in 2007 to 14.6% in 2008. Bangladesh’s exports in 
2008 were composed of Readymade garments (RMG) – 76%, Frozen food – 
4%, Jute and Jute goods – 3%, Leather and Leather goods – 2%, and others – 
15%. Its main imports included capital machinery – 36%, and major primary 
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goods – 17%. Remittances from expatriate workers has become an important 
sources of revenue for the country, as man power exports from Bangladesh 
witnessed large growth between 2002 to 2008 (i.e. 225300 to 875100). In 2001-
02 the remittance was US$2.5b which amounted to 5.3% of GDP and 41.8% of 
export. This increased to US$7.9b in 2007-08 which amounted to 10% of GDP 
and 56.1% of exports. The average exchanges rate for the national currency 
Taka against the US$ were: 58.94 take in 2003-04, 61.39 in 2004-05, 67.08 in 
2005-06, 69.03 in 2006-07, and 68.60 in 2007-08. FDI as % of GDP declined 
during 2007-08 and stood at 7%. The foreign exchange reserve was US$ 5.6b in 
February 2009 (Ministry of Finance, 2008, 2008a).  
 
Table 8: Bangladesh: Main Economic Indicators 
Indicators 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 
EXPORTS: 
Total primary Commodities 
(US$ million) 
484 390 462 553 648 773 832 987 
Share of Total Exports (%) 7.5 6.5 7.1 7.3 7.5 7.3 6.8 7.0 
Total Manufacturing Goods 
(US$ million) 
5 983 5 596 6 086 7 050 8 007 9 753 11 346 13 123 
Share of Total Exports (%) 92.5 93.5 92.9 92.7 92.5 92.7 93.2 93.0 
Exports - GRAND TOTAL 6 467 5 986 6 548 7 603 8 655 10 526 12 178 14 110 
Annual Change (%) 12.4 -7.4 9.4 16.1 13.8 21.6 15.7 15.9 
Exports as % of GDP 13.8 12.6 12.6 13.5 14.3 17.0 17.8 17.9 
IMPORTS: 
Major Primary Goods  
(US$ million) 
1 046 812 1 133 1 339 1 676 1 854 1 957 3 407 
Share of Total Imports (%) 11.2 9.5 11.7 12.3 12.8 12.6 12.3 16.7 
Major Industrial Goods 
(US$ million) 
1 380 1 311 1 548 1 910 2 662  3 002 3 055 3 969 
Share of Total Imports (%) 14.8 15.4 16.0 17.5 20.3 20.4 19.1 19.5 
Capital Machinery  
(US$ million) 
482 554 548 729 1 115 1 539 1 545 1 415 
Share of Total Imports (%) 5.2 6.5 5.7 6.7 8.5 10.4 9.7 7.0 
Other Products  
(US$ million) 
6 027 5 863  6 429 6 925 7 694 8 351 9414 11 582 
Share of Total Imports (%) 64.6 68.7 66.6 63.5 58.5 56.6 60.0 56.9 
Imports - GRAND TOTAL 9 335 8 540 9 658 10 903 13 147 14 746 15 971 20 373 
Annual Change (%) 11.5 -8.5 13.1 12.9 20.6 12.2 8.3 27.6 
Imports as % of GDP 19.9 18.0 18.6 19.3 21.8 23.8 23.3 25.8 
Source: Ministry of Finance (2008), Bangladesh Economy and Global Financial Crisis: Policy Response, Dhaka: Government 
of Bangladesh, p.58, 61, and 64. 
 
 
Table 8 presents exports and imports statistics for Bangladesh between 2000-01 
to 2007-08. The exports consist of primary commodities (frozen food, raw jute, 
tea, agricultural products and other primary commodities – in that order), and 
manufacturing goods (readymade garments, knitwear, jute goods, leather, jute 
goods, leather, engineering products, shoe, and others – in that order). Total 
exports more than doubled during this period and increased its share of GDP 
from 13% to 18%. The RMG export which forms about 75% of total exports 
was maintained mainly because the export to the US did not decline 
significantly. Also, orders from Europe increased for essential leather items as 
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cost of production is lower in Bangladesh than India and China (World Bank, 
2009). The imports consisted of primary goods (12-16% of total imports), 
industrial goods (15 to 20%), capital machinery (6-9%) and other imports (56 to 
65%). Total imports also more than doubled during this period and increased its 
share of GDP from 18% to 26%. 
 
The global recession has significantly affected Bangladesh in number of areas: 
(i) the export was in seven months export of raw jute decreased by 15.20% jute 
goods by 19.80%, leather goods by 31.80% and frozen food by 50% (according 
to Export promotion Bureau); (ii) export of readymade garments decreased by 
4.98% and 17.58% in January and February 2009 respectively; (iii) manpower 
export was also affected, as many workers returned home from Malaysia (which 
cancelled visas of 55, 000 workers), Kuwait, Dubai, and South Arabia; (iv) jute, 
sugar, and spinning industries were affected and 17 out of 80 jute mills fully 
stopped production; (v) over 150,000 workers lost their jobs; (vi) Tk30b worth 
goods from spinning mills remained unsold (Manik, 2009).  
 
Although the global recession was expected to have negative impact on 
Bangladesh, “its impact is still expected to be less severe than in most other 
economies” (Ministry of Finance, 2009, p. 3). According to the World Bank, 
“Bangladesh has weathered the global economic crisis well so far” and “low 
integration with the world economy helped cushion Bangladesh from the 
negative effects of the crisis” (World Bank, 2009, p.1). A number of factors that 
enabled Bangladesh to avoid serious problems included: (i) limited exposure to 
global economy in terms of exports (18% of GDP), (ii) its predominant exports-
readymade garments are low priced product for low end market which is 
relatively recession resistant; (iii) low international food and oil prices, (iv) 
importance of agriculture for economic growth (bumper rice crop during the 
year); (v) presence of large informal sector comprising of domestic trade and 
commerce; (vi) minimal exposure to international capital market (i.e. less 
vulnerable to withdrawal of foreign capital); and (vii) maintaining sustainable 
level of budget deficit and public debt; and (viii) significant appreciation of the 
national currency Taka against many currencies such as Euro, Canadian$ and 
Australia $ has made imports from these countries cheaper (Ministry of Finance, 
2009; World Bank, 2009). 
 
In addition, lower inflation, strong remittance flows leading to external current 
account surplus, significant export growth, and declining imports helped to 
reduce the negative impact of global crisis on Bangladesh. These factors also 
contributed to increased liquidity in the banking system during 2009. The 
deposits held with the central bank – Bangladesh Bank – by the commercial 
banks increased from Tk18.6 b in June 2008 to Tk128b by the end of June 2009 
(i.e. 75% growth compared to just 12% in 2008).  
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However, the second half of 2009 witnessed flagging growth in remittances 
(declining from 30.9% in first half to 15.7% in second half) and exports (RMG 
exports declined by 6% and non readymade goods registered negative growth). 
The World Bank warned that the export growth will slow down further, as 
demands in the US and European markets may take longer to return to previous 
levels. The remittances also could be affected if the global economic conditions 
continue to worsen. It also warned that inflationary pressures may re-emerge 
affecting the poor population badly. It identified structural problems which 
needs policy attention: economic governance, urban management, infrastructure 
development, market oriented vocational skills and quality secondary and 
tertiary education (World Bank, 2009). IMF also cautioned that the growth 
momentum will be slowed due to increased inflation, weak imports of capital 
machinery, sluggish exports and private sector credit, declining demand for 
Bangladeshi workers abroad, and also uncertainty about strong performance of 
the agriculture sector as in FY2009 (IMF, 2010, p. 2). 
 
To summarize, Bangladesh economy was affected by the global recession 
mainly in exports and remittances, particularly in the second half of 2009. 
However, the impact was not very severe because its economy is less integrated 
with the world economy with limited exposure in terms of exports, its 
predominant exports-readymade garments are low priced product for low end 
market which is relatively recession resistant, importance of agriculture for 
economic growth, presence of large informal sector comprising of domestic 
trade and commerce, and minimal exposure to international capital market. 
Also, its economy depends on remittances from workers mainly in Malaysia and 
the Middle East. 
 
8. The Case of Nepal 
The growth rate of Nepal’s economy in the previous 50 year period was very 
low and barely sufficient to cope with population growth rate and its GDP per 
capita (US$470) income ranks amongst the lowest in the world. As the rate of 
savings was about 11.5% of GDP, the economy depended on foreign assistance 
to meet investment requirement. However, between 1996-97 to 2006-07 human 
development index improved and poverty incidence reduced from 42% to 31%. 
The economy is driven and sustained by agriculture (which can be affected by 
erratic rains and snowfalls), tourism, manpower exports (income from foreign 
remittances), other exports, and foreign assistance. Remittances in 2008 
amounted to 20% of GDP.  
 
In 2006 the internal conflict (between the government forces and the Maoists) in 
Nepal came to an end and with that the monarchy also came to an end. The 
country is going through transition from feudalism to industrial capitalism and 
aims to achieve rapid socio-economic transformation with a three pronged 
strategy: (i) promotion of private investment in growth propelling sectors; (ii) 
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Public-private partnership in large infrastructure projects; (iii) cooperatives in 
rural areas in agriculture related activities and public distribution (IMF, 2008).  
 
Nepal has introduced a number of structural reforms since 2006. That is, reforms 
to tax administration to reduce leakages and broaden the tax base, financial 
sector reforms through Bank and Financial Institutions Act to strengthen 
financial sector’s integrity and financial stability, and improvements to public 
expenditure management and increased fiscal transparency. The central bank – 
Nepal Rastra Bank (NRB) has been maintaining the exchange rate peg to Indian 
Rupee which maintain inflation broadly in line with that of India. However, 
banking sector reforms are slow, enforcement of prudential regulation is weak, 
and the public sector accountability mechanisms are inadequate (IMF, 2009a). 
IMF identified other problems such as loose monetary conditions resulting in 
“real negative interest rates, rapid and potentially destabilising stock market and 
property prices, and some capital flight to India”(IMF, 2008a).  
 
Table 9 shows macroeconomic indicators for Nepal between 2001 and 2009. 
The real GDP growth has been maintained around 4% since 2006 except 2007 
(due to poor performance by agriculture sector). The gross domestic savings (% 
of GDP) has remained about 9 to 11%. The inflation has remained stable during 
2006 to 2008 (mainly due to the exchange rate peg to Indian Rupee), but it 
reached double digit in 2009 due to high food prices. Gross domestic investment 
has increased marginally over the years. Budget balance and current account 
balance have been under sustainable levels and the money supply growth has 
increased by 10 to 15% until 2008. Export growth rate has been inconsistent 
while the import growth rate has been about 10% to 15% since 2006. The top 
ranking categories of exports in 2007 were as following: 1. Manufactured goods 
(US$300.5m); 2. Knotted carpets and other textile floor covering (US$111.1); 3. 
Food and live animals (US$62.7); 4. Women’s’ and girls’ trousers, bib and 
brace overalls, breaches and shorts of woven textile fabrics (US$39.5m); 5. 
Mens’ and girls’ trousers, bib and brace overalls, breaches and shorts of woven 
textile fabrics (US$39.1m); and 6. Plated or zinc-coated iron and non-alloy steel 
flat-rolled products (US$38.2m) (ICON, 2007). However, the export sector is 
very small compared to the total economy. This mainly because of the land 
locked nature of Nepal and higher transportation costs involved (which adds 
more than 15% to the total cost of products). Also the manufacturing sector is 
very small (7% of GDP) (Bhattarai, 2009). 
 
In 2008, the share of agriculture sector in GDP was 32% (36% in 2001), the 
non-agriculture sector was 68% (64% in 2001), the share of manufacturing 
declined to 7% from 9%, and the share of service sector increased from 47% to 
51% as linkages with global economy is expanding. The Labour Act of 1992 
imposed certain restrictions on employers in hiring contract workers and laying 
off permanent workers (Khanal, 2009).  
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Although Nepal’s financial system is under developed, it is comparable to other 
counties in the region such as Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Vietnam. In 2007 the 
total assets of the banking system to GDP amounted to 81% of which one third 
belonged to public sector banks. The role of stock exchange in Nepal remained 
marginal. The banking sector has witnessed growing number of deposit-taking 
institutions, and rapid credit growth driven by mostly smaller banking 
institutions (IMF, 2008b). The central bank – NRB has taken regulatory 
measures against risky bank activities to avoid crisis, particularly the real estate 
based and margin lending activities by commercial banks. As a result the stock 
prices have stabilised, although land prices remain high. 
 
Because of weak linkages to global financial markets, Nepal was not expected to 
be affected directly by the global financial crisis. However, it was expected to 
have some indirect impact on exports, tourism receipts, remittance flow, and aid 
flow. Until the early 2009, these areas have not been seriously affected 
compared to previous year. The devaluation of the national currency per US$ by 
12.2% during 2008-09 appears to have significantly contributed to the export 
growth.  
 
However, there seems to have some delayed impact on the economy and the 
overall impact of global recession appears to be mixed in Nepal.  
 
The governor of the Bank for Nepal stated (IMF, 2009b, p.1-2):  
 
Contrary to our worst fears, remittance remained robust, tourism did not 
decline, aid commitments and exports did not suffer much. Domestic 
financial market remained stable although we have our own worries of 
property and stock market bubbles, high credit-to-deposit ratio in the banking 
sector and above all, a serious unemployment problem. At the same time 
fiscal burden created due to rising petroleum prices in the past is yet to be 
made up.  
 
According to IMF (2009, p.1): “despite the recent political fragility and the 
global financial crisis, the macroeconomic situation in Nepal remains broadly 
stable.” But the real GDP growth in 2009 was lower than previous year due to 
power shortages, difficult industrial labour relations, and bad weather. Due to 
continued growth in remittances the current account and balance of payment 
remained surplus and also the foreign exchange reserve was high (8 months 
imports). The budget deficit was maintained at 1.5% of GDP through strong 
revenue growth and under spending. But the inflation reached 13% due to high 
food prices.  
 
 
 
 29
Table 9: Nepal: Main Economic Indicators 
Indicators 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008* 2009*
Real GDP Growth Rates (%) 5.9 4.7 0.2 3.8 4.4 2.9 4.1 2.6 4.7+ 4+
Gross Domestic Savings 
Rates (% of GDP) 
14.1 11.7 9.5 8.6 11.7 11.6 9.0 9.7 11.5 -- 
Gross Domestic Investment 
Rates (% of GDP) 
22.6 22.3 20.2 21.4 24.5 26.5 26.8 28.0 32.0 -- 
Inflation Rates (%) 3.4 2.4 2.9 4.8 4.0 4.5 8.0 6.4 7.7 13+
Budget Balance (% of GDP) -4.3 -5.5 -5.0 -3.3 -2.9 -3.1 -3.8 -4.1 -4.0 -- 
Current Account Balance  
(% of GDP) 
2.9 4.5 4.2 2.4 2.7 2.0 2.2 -0.1 2.6 -- 
Change in Money Supply 
(%) 
21.8 15.2 4.4 9.8 12.8 8.3 15.6 13.8 20.9 -- 
Merchandise Export Growth 
Rates (%) 
37.6 4.6 -18.8 4.3 8.9 13.0 2.2 1.2 11.0 -- 
Merchandise Import Growth 
Rates (%) 
22.1 -0.2 -10.6 13.6 10.6 13.8 15.8 15.0 26.0 -- 
Source: ESCAP, Economic and Social Survey of Asia and the Pacific 2009, Tables 1 to 9, pp. 174-182, New York: United Nations. 
* Either estimated figure or for only part of the year. + IMF (2009), Nepal-Assessment Letter for the Asian Development Bank, August 
17. Available at: http://www.imf.org/external/pp/longres.aspx?id=4349 (Accessed on: 23 March 2010)  
 
 
To recapitulate, Nepal was not expected to be seriously affected by the global 
financial crisis as it is not strongly linked to global financial markets. However, 
it was expected to have some indirect impact on exports, tourism receipts, 
remittance flow, and aid flow. But, until the early 2009, remittance remained 
strong, tourism, aid commitments and exports did not decline significantly. 
Other factors that influenced the weak impact of global crisis on the national 
economy included the marginal role played by the stock exchange in Nepal, 
Nepal’s under developed financial system, the ability of the central bank - NRB 
to take regulatory measures against risky bank activities to avoid crisis, 
particularly the real estate based and margin lending activities by commercial 
banks, and the influence of it NSI neighbourhood (India), i.e. exchange rate peg 
to Indian Rupee which helped maintain inflation broadly in line with that of 
India. 
 
 
9. Analysis of Cases 
 
Table 10: Comparison of Real GDP Growth Rates (%) among Case Countries 
Indicators 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008* 2009* 
South Korea 8.5 3.8 7.0 3.1 4.7 4.2 5.1 5.0 2.2 -1.8 
Taiwan -- -- -- -- 6.2 4.2 4.8 5.7 0.1 -1.9 
Malaysia 8.9 0.5 5.4 5.8 6.8 5.3 5.8 6.3 4.6 -4.5 
Thailand 4.8 2.2 5.3 7.1 6.3 4.5 5.1 4.9 2.5 -2.8 
Bangladesh 5.9 5.3 4.4 5.3 6.3 6.0 6.6 6.4 6.2 5.9 
Nepal 5.9 4.7 0.2 3.8 4.4 2.9 4.1 2.6 4.7 4 
Source: ESCAP (2009), Economic and Social Survey of Asia and the Pacific 2009, Adapted from Table 1, p. 174, 
New York: United Nations.* Either estimated figures or for only part of the year/ These are figures are based on 
ESCAP(2009) and also other sources listed in previous tables under individual case country sections.  
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Table 10 clearly shows that all the case economies have been growing until the 
global recession and they experienced some negative impact on their GDP 
growth rate. The differences are found in the drivers of each economy, 
composition of sector-wise contribution to GDP, composition of trade and trade 
partners, and the degree of integration of the national economy to the global 
institutions. For example, Bangladesh and Nepal are dependent significantly on 
remittances and aids, which is not the case in other economies. South Korea and 
Taiwan are more dependent on exports of manufactured goods compared to 
Malaysia and Thailand. But Malaysia is more dependent on exports of 
manufacture goods than Thailand. The impact of global recession and the shape 
of recovery by each country show the influence of each country’s NSI.  
 
Table 11 shows that the gross domestic savings as % of GDP across case 
countries except Taiwan (because data not available). Clearly Malaysia has 
consistently registered a higher savings rates, followed by South Korea, 
Thailand, Bangladesh, and Nepal. One of the main reasons for Malaysia to 
experience less severity of the global recession despite big capital outflow was 
due to high domestic savings. Table 12 shows that the gross domestic 
investment rate in South Korea has been about 30% and between 20 to 30% 
among other countries, except Taiwan.  
 
 
Table 11: Comparison of Gross Domestic Savings Rates (% of GDP) among Case 
Countries 
Indicators 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008* 2009* 
South Korea 33.9 31.9 31.4 33.0 35.0 33.2 31.5 30.8 30.7 28.8 
Taiwan -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Malaysia 46.1 41.8 42.0 42.5 43.4 42.8 43.2 42.2 41.8 -- 
Thailand 32.5 31.4 31.7 32.0 31.7 31.0 32.3 33.9 33.3 -- 
Bangladesh 17.9 18.0 18.2 18.6 19.5 20.0 20.2 20.5 20.8 20.0 
Nepal 14.1 11.7 9.5 8.6 11.7 11.6 9.0 9.7 11.5 -- 
Source: ESCAP (2009), Economic and Social Survey of Asia and the Pacific 2009, Adapted from Table 1, p. 174, 
New York: United Nations.* These are figures are based on ESCAP(2009) and also other sources listed in previous 
tables under individual case country sections and some of them are estimated figures. 
 
 
 
Table 12: Comparison of Gross Domestic Investment Rates (% of GDP) among Case 
Countries 
Indicators 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008* 2009* 
South Korea 31.0 29.3 29.1 30.0 30.4 30.1 29.8 29.4 31.4 25.5 
Taiwan -- -- -- -- 19.5 1.2 0.9 1.9 -10.8 1.5 
Malaysia 26.9 24.4 24.8 22.8 23.0 20.0 20.9 21.9 19.8 20.8 
Thailand 22.8 24.1 23.8 25.0 26.8 31.4 28.5 26.8 29.6 -- 
Bangladesh 23.0 23.1 23.2 23.4 24.0 24.5 24.7 24.3 24.2 24.2 
Nepal 22.6 22.3 20.2 21.4 24.5 26.5 26.8 28.0 32.0 -- 
Source: ESCAP (2009), Economic and Social Survey of Asia and the Pacific 2009, Adapted from Table 1, p. 174, 
New York: United Nations.* These are figures are based on ESCAP(2009) and also other sources listed in previous 
tables under individual case country sections and some of them are estimated figures.  
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Table 13 shows that Bangladesh and Nepal had experienced higher inflation 
since 2006 until the global recession and all countries have seen increase in 
inflation in 2008 and 2009. Table 14 shows that all countries except Korea have 
registered negative budget balance but within sustainable level (less than 5%). 
Table 15 shows that Malaysia has maintained high current account balance 
followed by Taiwan.  
 
 
Table 13: Comparison of Inflation Rates (%) among Case Countries 
Indicators 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008* 2009* 
South Korea 2.3 4.1 2.8 3.5 3.6 2.8 2.2 2.5 4.3 3.5 
Taiwan -- -- -- -- 1.6 2.3 0.6 1.8 3.5 -1.3 
Malaysia 1.5 1.4 1.8 1.0 1.5 3.0 3.6 2.0 5.4 0.9 
Thailand 1.6 1.6 0.6 1.8 2.8 4.5 4.6 2.2 5.5 -0.9 
Bangladesh 2.8 1.9 2.8 4.4 5.8 6.5 7.2 7.2 9.9 6.7 
Nepal 3.4 2.4 2.9 4.8 4.0 4.5 8.0 6.4 7.7 13 
Source: ESCAP (2009), Economic and Social Survey of Asia and the Pacific 2009, Adapted from Table 1, p. 174, 
New York: United Nations.* These are figures are based on ESCAP(2009) and also other sources listed in 
previous tables under individual case country sections and some of them are estimated figures. 
 
 
 
Table 14: Comparison of Budget Balance (% of GDP) among Case Countries 
Indicators 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008* 2009* 
South Korea 1.1 1.2 3.3 1.1 0.7 0.4 0.4 3.8 1.2 -2.9 
Taiwan -- -- -- -- -2.4 -1.6 -0.7 -0.4 -1.3e -5.2 
Malaysia -5.5 -5.2 -5.3 -5.0 -4.1 -3.6 -3.3 -3.2 -5.1 -- 
Thailand -2.2 -2.4 -1.4 0.4 0.1 -0.6 1.1 -2.4 -1.2 -4.7 
Bangladesh -6.1 -5.2 -4.7 -4.2 -4.2 -4.4 -3.9 -3.7 -4.6 -3.0 
Nepal -4.3 -5.5 -5.0 -3.3 -2.9 -3.1 -3.8 -4.1 -4.0 -- 
Source: ESCAP, Economic and Social Survey of Asia and the Pacific 2009, Adapted from Table 5, p. 178, New 
York: United Nations.* These are figures are based on ESCAP(2009) and also other sources listed in previous 
tables under individual case country sections and some of them are estimated figures. 
 
 
 
Table 15: Comparison of Current Account Balance (% of GDP) among Case Countries 
Indicators 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008* 2009* 
South Korea 2.4 1.7 1.0 2.0 4.1 1.9 0.6 0.6 -6.4 9.6 
Taiwan -- -- -- -- 5.7 4.9 7.2 8.6 6.3 12.8 
Malaysia 9.0 7.9 7.1 12.0 12.0 14.5 16.1 15.6 17.4 12.8 
Thailand 7.6 4.4 3.7 3.4 1.7 -4.3 1.1 6.1 0.5 8.1 
Bangladesh -1.0 -2.5 0.3 0.3 0.3 -0.9 1.3 1.4 0.9 2.8 
Nepal 2.9 4.5 4.2 2.4 2.7 2.0 2.2 -0.1 2.6 -- 
Source: ESCAP (2009), Economic and Social Survey of Asia and the Pacific 2009, Adapted from Table 1, p. 174, 
New York: United Nations.* These are figures are based on ESCAP(2009) and also other sources listed in 
previous tables under individual case country sections and some of them are estimated figures. 
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Table 16: Comparison of Merchandise Export Growth Rates (%) among Case Countries 
Indicators 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008* 2009* 
South Korea 19.9 -12.7 8.0 19.3 31.0 12.0 14.4 14.1 14.3 -20.3 
Taiwan -- -- -- -- 21.1 8.8 12.9 10.1 3.6 -34.3  
Malaysia 16.2 -10.4 6.9 11.3 20.8 11.5 13.4 9.6 11.5 -13.1 
Thailand 19.5 -7.1 4.8 18.2 21.6 15.0 16.9 17.2 5.1 -13.0 
Bangladesh 8.3 12.4 -7.4 9.4 16.1 13.8 21.6 15.7 15.9 10.1 
Nepal 37.6 4.6 -18.8 4.3 8.9 13.0 2.2 1.2 11.0 -- 
Source: ESCAP (2009), Economic and Social Survey of Asia and the Pacific 2009, Adapted from Table 1, p. 174, New 
York: United Nations.* These are figures are based on ESCAP(2009) and also other sources listed in previous tables under 
individual case country sections and some of them are estimated figures. 
 
Table 16 and 17 show comparison of export and import growth rates among 
case countries. All countries registered declining exports and imports after the 
global recession set in 2008. Except Nepal all other countries have witnessed 
consistent export growth. Between 2003 and 2008, all countries achieved 
significant import growth. But in 2008 and 2009 all countries except Nepal have 
experienced big drop in their export growth rates. Taiwan and South Korea were 
particularly hit hard because of their reliance on Western markets. 
 
Table 17: Comparison of Merchandise Import Growth Rates (%) among Case Countries 
Indicators 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009* 
South Korea 34.0 -12.1 7.8 17.6 25.5 16.4 18.4 15.3 21.8 -28.7 
Taiwan -- -- -- -- 31.8 8.2 11.0 8.2 9.8 -41.2 
Malaysia 25.1 -10.0 8.2 4.4 26.4 9.2 14.7 12.0 6.8 -9.0 
Thailand 31.3 -3.0 4.6 17.4 25.7 25.9 9.0 8.7 26.5 -25.9 
Bangladesh 4.6 11.5 -8.5 13.1 12.9 20.6 12.2 16.3 25.6 4.2 
Nepal 22.1 -0.2 -10.6 13.6 10.6 13.8 15.8 15.0 26.0 -- 
Source: ESCAP (2009), Economic and Social Survey of Asia and the Pacific 2009, Adapted from Table 1, p. 174, New 
York: United Nations.* These are figures are based on ESCAP(2009) and also other sources listed in previous tables under 
individual case country sections and some of them are estimated figures. 
 
 
 
Table 18: Comparison of External Financing – Total Bonds, Equities, and Loans among Case 
Countries* (In US$ million) 
Country 2004  2005 2006 2007 
 
2008 
 
Total Emerging 
Markets 
325 729.6 454 640.3 540 183.9 716 401.2 446 540.0 
Asia 152 357.7 189 506.2 221 354.8 299 440.3 184 925.9 
South Korea 31 016.0 47 668.6 38 677.3 59 814.4 34 258.3 
Taiwan 26 558.0 19 084.9 22 189.9 24 623.2 18 012.2 
Malaysia 7 977.8 6 154.6 7 686.9 7 068.2 5 260.2 
Thailand 4 141.3 6 310.9 4 784.1 2 494.2 3 070.4 
Bangladesh 176.8 16.7 106.5 57.5 65.4 
Nepal -- -- -- -- 15.0 
Source: IMF (2009), Global Financial Stability Report: Responding to the Financial Crisis and Measuring Systematic 
Risk, April, Washington D.C: IMF, Adapted from Table 14, p. 202. 
* External public syndicated issuance, excluding bilateral deals
 
Table 18 shows that how big is the size of external financing to each selected 
economy and it’s clear that South Korea and Taiwan far ahead of Malaysia and 
Nepal is hardly linked to external finance. Table 19 clearly shows the 
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dependence of Bangladesh and Nepal on overseas aids and workers’ 
remittances.  
 
 
Table 19: Comparison of Official Development Assistance (ODA) and Workers’ Remittances 
among Case Countries 
 ODA Received Workers’ Remittances 
 US$ million % of GNI US$ million % of GNI 
Indicators 2000 2006 2000 2006 1995 2000 2006 1995 2000 2006 
South Korea -- -- -- -- 291.4 62.9 136.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 
Taiwan -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Malaysia 45.4 240.3 0.1 0.2 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Thailand 698.2 -215.6 0.6 -0.1 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Bangladesh 1 167.8 1 222.7 2.5 1.9 1 201.7 1 958.1 5 417.7 3.1 4.2 8.4 
Nepal 387.3 514.3 7.0 6.3 56.8 11.5 1 373.3 1.3 2.0 16.8 
Source: ESCAP, Economic and Social Survey of Asia and the Pacific 2009, Adapted from Table 11, p. 184, New York: 
United Nations.  
 
 
Table 20: Comparison of Gross Domestic Expenditure on R&D (GERD) as % of GDP among 
Case Countries  
Country 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
South Korea 2.39 2.59 2.53 2.63 2.85 2.98 3.22 3.47 
Taiwan 1.97 1.94 2.06 2.16 2.27 2.32 2.39 2.57 
(2.77)+ 
Malaysia 0.49 -- 0.69 -- 0.60 -- 0.64 -- 
Thailand 0.25 0.26 0.24 0.26 0.26 0.23 0.25 -- 
Bangladesh -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Nepal -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Source: UNESCO - Statistics on Research and Development, and Education. Available at: 
http://stats.uis.unesco.org/unesco/ReportFolders/ReportFolders.aspx (Accessed: 23 March 2010). National Science 
Council (2009), Indicators of Science and Technology – Taiwan, 2009, Available at: 
https://nscnt12.nsc.gov.tw/WAS2/English/AsEmain.aspx (Accessed on 23 March 2010) 
* Based on national estimation; + 2008 figure. 
 
 
Table 21: Comparison of Public Expenditure on Education among Case Countries 
Country As % of GDP As % of Total Government 
Expenditure 
2000 2005 2000 2005 
South Korea 4.3 4.6 14.7 16.5 
Taiwan (% of GNP) N 5.4 5.9 (5.5*) 17.8 20.0 (21.0*) 
Malaysia 6.2 6.2 26.7 25.2 
Thailand 5.4 4.2 31.0 25.0 
Bangladesh 2.4 2.7 15.0 14.2 
Nepal 3.0 3.4 13.2 14.9 
Source: UNESCO - Statistics on Research and Development, and Education. Available at: 
http://stats.uis.unesco.org/unesco/ReportFolders/ReportFolders.aspx (Accessed: 23 March 2010). N - Ministry of 
Education – Taiwan (2008), Educational Expenditure. Available at: 
http://english.moe.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=10983&CtNode=816&mp= 1 (Accessed: 23 March 2010). * 2008 Figures. 
 
 
Table 20 and Table 21 illustrate the investment in R&D and education in case 
countries. For Bangladesh and Nepal, data were not available for R&D 
investment. South Korea and Taiwan are far ahead of Malaysia and Thailand in 
R&D investment, and Thailand is significantly behind Malaysia. Almost all 
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countries are investing significantly in education, but in terms of GDP, 
Bangladesh has been investing less than Nepal, and Malaysia has been investing 
more than others. 
 
 
Table 22: Some Major Components of NSI that Could have Mitigating Impact on Recession –  
South Korea 
 
Components of NSI  Nature/ Level of Presence in National Economy of South Korea 
1. The general investment climate and 
economic policy framework:  
(a)Macroeconomic and social stability 
(b) National fiscal policy regime 
(c) Foreign debt 
(d) Inflation 
(e) Interest rate and  
(f) Regulatory regime such as trade and tax 
policies 
(g) Nature and role of FDI  
(a) GDP growth dropped from 5% in 2007 to 2.2% in 2008, and -1.8% in 2009.  
(b) Current account balance was -6.4% of GDP and budget deficit was -2.9% of 
GDP in 2009 (it was surplus 1.2% of GDP in 2008). 
(c) External financing (total bonds, equities, and loans) amounted to US$34b in 
2008; increased from 36.5% of GDP in 2008 to 40.9% of GDP in 2009. 
(d) Inflation increased from 2.5% in 2007 to 4.3% in 2008 (estimated as 3.5% in 
2009) 
(e) Reduced interest rate / National currency Won appreciated significantly before 
the current crisis (1$ = 929) and depreciated significantly (30%) due to global 
crisis (1$= 1100 in 2008 and 1317 in 2009). 
(f) Strong regulatory regime after 1997-98 crisis; responded to present crisis with 
measures such US$55b in foreign exchange reserves to provide swaps or loans to 
banks, trade related businesses, cutting interest rates, exchange rate devaluation, 
financial support for SMEs, and investing in job creation programmes.  
(g) Faster foreign capital outflow than 1997-98 crisis.  
2. Market, per capita income, domestic savings: 
(a) Domestic market size / structure 
(b) Links to regional and global markets 
(c) Domestic savings Growth 
(a) Small domestic market and constrained by highly leveraged households and 
SMEs. Korean economy depends on external demands and global financial 
conditions. High per capita income. 
(b) Strong links to Asian markets – China & Hong Kong, Japan and the US. 
(c) High gross domestic savings rate of growth (around 30% of GDP over the 
years). 
3. Industrial structure:  
(a) Presence of diverse industrial structure  
(b) Strength of domestic firms 
(c) Presence and role of foreign firms 
(d) Links to foreign companies/ foreign 
financial market 
 
(a) Diversified sectors, but the Services sector is dominating with 57.6% of GDP, 
Industry – 39.4%, and Agriculture – 3% of GDP. (b) Strong domestic firms and 
internationally competitive. Stock prices fell by 30% in response to global crisis.  
(c) Significant presence of foreign investment and fast withdrawal of foreign 
investment due to global crisis. 
(d) Strong links to foreign financial market. 
4. Financial Institutions: 
(a) Banking sector 
(b) Role and effectiveness of the Central Bank 
(c) Links to foreign financial market 
(a) Strong banking sector, but faced big reduction in their credit lines resulting in 
reduction in capital account (6% of GDP) due to global crisis. 
(b) Strong central bank, it cut interest rates and set up bank recapitalization fund 
and toxic asset fund to shield the banking sector from the global crisis. 
(c) Strong links to foreign financial market. 
5. Foreign Trade: 
(a) Nature of exports 
(b) Export markets (Destinations) 
(c) Dependence on commodity exports 
 
(a) Exports growth declined from 14% in 2008 to -20% in 2009 due to recession. 
Exports included: semiconductors, wireless telecommunications equipment, motor 
vehicles, computers, steel, ships, and petrochemicals. 
(b) Main markets for exports are: Asian markets – China & Hong Kong, Japan 
(33% of total exports) and the US (11% of total exports). 
(c) No dependence on commodity exports.  
6. Skills, R&D, and Technology development: 
(a) Investment in education and skills (human 
resources) development 
(b) Investment in R&D 
 
(a) Investment in education and skills has been between 4 to 4.5% of GDP and 14 
to 16% of Total government expenditure. New investments announced in response 
to recession. 
(b) Investment in R&D has been between 3 to 3.5% of GDP 
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Table 23: Some Major Components of NSI that Could have Mitigating Impact on Recession – Taiwan 
 
Components of NSI  Nature/ Level of Presence in National Economy of Taiwan 
1. The general investment climate and 
economic policy framework:  
(a)Macroeconomic and social stability 
(b) National fiscal policy regime 
(c) Foreign debt 
(d) Inflation 
(e) Interest rate and  
(f) Regulatory regime such as trade and tax 
policies 
(g) Nature and role of FDI  
(a) GDP growth dropped from 5.7% in 2007 to 0.1% in 2008 and to -1.9% in 2009. 
(b) Current account balance was – 6.3% of GDP in 2008 and 9.6% in 2009 and 
budget deficit has gone up to 1.3% of GDP in 2008 to 5.2% in 2009. 
(c) Total External financing including bonds, equities and loans amounted to 
US$24b in 2007 and US$18b in 2008. 
(d) Inflation increased from 1.8% in 2007 to 3.5% in 2008 and registered -1.3% in 
2009. 
(e) Reduced interest rate / NT$ appreciated slightly against US$ (32.8 in 2007 to 
31.5 in 2008) before the current crisis and depreciated due to global crisis (34 in 
2009). 
(f) Strong regulatory regime; responded to present crisis with measures such full 
guarantee of all saving deposits and adoption of loose monetary policy to increase 
banks’ liquidity, mechanisms for debt negotiations between banks and borrowers, 
and support for SMEs. 
(g) High foreign exchange reserve consistently maintained, the world's fourth 
largest, behind China, Japan, and Russia. FDI inflow is still significant. 
2. Market, per capita income, domestic savings: 
(a) Domestic market size / structure 
(b) Links to regional and global markets 
(c) Domestic savings Growth 
(a) Small domestic market; High per capita income (US$39 000 at PPP in 2009). 
(b) Strong links to Asian markets (China & Hong Kong, Japan and ASEAN), EU 
and the US 
(c) –NA-- 
3. Industrial structure:  
(a) Presence of diverse industrial structure  
(b) Strength of domestic firms 
(c) Presence and role of foreign firms 
(d) Links to foreign companies/ foreign 
financial market 
 
(a) Diversified sectors but Services sector is growing; in 2008, their shares to GDP: 
Agriculture – 1.69%, Goods producing industry – 25.04%, and Services – 73.27%.  
(b) Strong domestic firms. Stock prices fell by 40% in second half of 2008 in 
response to global crisis.  
(c) Presence and role of foreign firms less significant. 
(d) Less exposure to foreign financial market. 
4. Financial Institutions: 
(a) Banking sector 
(b) Role and effectiveness of the Central Bank 
(c) Links to foreign financial market 
(a) Strong financial sector. 
(b) Strong central bank and it took many initiatives in response to current crisis. 
(c) The financial sector has low exposure to global financial market, but links to 
export markets affected the sector. 
5. Foreign Trade: 
(a) Nature of exports 
(b) Export markets (Destinations) 
(c) Dependence on commodity exports 
 
(a) Exports growth declined from 10% in 2007 to 3.6% in 2008 and to -34.3% in 
2009 due to current recession. Main exports included: electronics, flat panels, 
machinery, metals, textiles, plastics, chemical, optical, photographic, measuring, 
and medical instruments. 
(b) Main markets for exports are Asia -63% (China & Hong Kong, ASEAN, and 
Japan), Europe (11%), US (11%). 
(c) No dependence on commodity exports.  
6. Skills, R&D, and Technology development: 
(a) Investment in education and skills (human 
resources) development 
(b) Investment in R&D 
 
(a) Investment in education and skills has been between 5.5 to 6% of GNP and 20 
to 21% of Total government expenditure. New investments announced in response 
to recession. 
(b) Investment in R&D has been between 2.5 to 2.7% of GDP 
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Table 24: Some Major Components of NSI that Could have Mitigating Impact on Recession – Malaysia 
 
Components of NSI  Nature/ Level of Presence in National Economy of Malaysia 
1. The general investment climate and 
economic policy framework:  
(a) Macroeconomic and social stability 
(b) National fiscal policy regime 
(c) Foreign debt 
(d) Inflation 
(e) Interest rate and  
(f) Regulatory regime such as trade and tax 
policies 
(g) Nature and role of FDI  
(a) GDP growth dropped from 6.3% in 2007 to 4.6% in 2008 and to -4.5% in 2009. 
(b) Current account balance was – 15.6% of GDP in 2007 and 17.4% in 2008 and 
budget deficit has gone up to 3.2% of GDP in 2007 to 5.1% in 2008. 
(c) Total external debt declined from 27.9% of GDP in 2007 to 24.9% in 2008. 
(d) Inflation increased from 2.0% in 2007 to 5.4% in 2008 and estimated to be 1% 
in 2009. 
(e) Reduced interest rate / M$ appreciated slightly against US$ in 2007 and 2008 
and returned to the level of 2006 by 2009. 
(f) Strong regulatory regime which ensured ‘virtually no toxic asset ‘ in the 
financial system. Announced two economic stimulus packages totalling RM67b to 
help arrest the economy sliding into deep recession aimed at supporting strategic 
industries, developing infrastructure, and education and training programmes. 
(g) Increased its foreign exchange reserve to about US$90-100b by 2008. 
Significant role of FDI in the economy. Record FDI outflows (US$27b in 2008) 
due to global financial crisis. 
2. Market, per capita income, domestic savings: 
(a) Domestic market size / structure 
(b) Links to regional and global markets 
(c) Domestic savings Growth 
(a) Small domestic market; in 2007, its GDP per capita (PPP basis) was the seventh 
in Asia.  
(b) Strong links to mainly the Asian markets (China, Singapore, Japan, Thailand, 
and Hong Kong) and the US 
(c) Fell from 26% in 2000 to about 20 to 21% in 2008-09. 
3. Industrial structure:  
(a) Presence of diverse industrial structure  
(b) Strength of domestic firms 
(c) Presence and role of foreign firms 
(d) Links to foreign companies/ foreign 
financial market 
 
(a) Diversified sectors, contributions to GDP by different sectors in 2009 (estimate) 
were: agriculture - 10.1% ; industry: 42.3%; services: 47.6%.  
(b) Developing strong domestic firms. The Kuala Lumpur stock index fell by 30% 
between mid-2008 and March 2009 due to global crisis (but recovered by 25% in 
April-May).  
(c) Significant role of foreign investment/ firms. 
(d) Little exposure to foreign financial market. 
4. Financial Institutions: 
(a) Banking sector 
(b) Role and effectiveness of the Central Bank 
(c) Links to foreign financial market 
(a) Strong financial sector (after restructuring in post 1997-98 financial crisis). 
(b) Strong central bank and it took many initiatives in response to current crisis. 
(c) The financial sector has low exposure to global financial market, but links to 
export markets affected the sector. 
5. Foreign Trade: 
(a) Nature of exports 
(b) Export markets (Destinations) 
(c) Dependence on commodity exports 
 
(a) Exports growth declined from 13.4 % in 2006 to 11.5% in 2008 and to -13.1% 
in 2009 due to current recession. Malaysia exported electronic equipment, 
petroleum and liquefied natural gas, wood and wood products, palm oil, rubber, 
textiles, and chemicals.  
(b) Its export partners included (2009 estimate): Singapore 13.9%, China 12.2%, 
US 10.9%, Japan 9.8%, Thailand 5.4%, and Hong Kong 5.2%. 
(c) Significant dependence on commodity exports.  
6. Skills, R&D, and Technology development: 
(a) Investment in education and skills (human 
resources) development 
(b) Investment in R&D 
 
(a) Investment in education and skills has been between 6.0 to 6.5% of GDP and 
25 to 26% of Total government expenditure. New investments were announced in 
response to recession. 
(b) Investment in R&D has been between 0.6 to 0.7% of GDP 
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Table 25: Some Major Components of NSI that Could have Mitigating Impact on Recession – Thailand 
 
Components of NSI  Nature/ Level of Presence in National Economy of Thailand 
1. The general investment climate and 
economic policy framework:  
(a) Macroeconomic and social stability 
(b) National fiscal policy regime 
(c) Foreign debt 
(d) Inflation 
(e) Interest rate and  
(f) Regulatory regime such as trade and tax 
policies 
(g) Nature and role of FDI  
(a) GDP growth dropped from 4.9% in 2007 to 2.5% in 2008 and to -2.8% in 2009. 
(b) Current account balance was 6.1% of GDP in 2007, 0.5% in 2008 and 8.1% in 
2009. Budget deficit has gone up to 2.4% of GDP in 2007 to 4.7% in 2009. 
(c) Total external debt remained between US$ 50b to 60b. 
(d) Inflation increased from 2.2% in 2007 to 8.5% in 2008 and estimated as -0.9% 
in 2009. 
(e) Reduced interest rate (7.1% in 2008 to 6.6.% in 2009)/ The national currency 
Baht appreciated significantly against US$ in 2007 and 2008. 
(f) Relatively strong regulatory regime, but the central bank is not fully 
independent. Announced stimulus package to sustain economic stability by 
targeting free education programmes, job creation, low interest loans to farmers, 
lower water and electricity charges and support to low income families  
(g) Increased its foreign exchange reserve due to banks switching their assets 
abroad to domestic assets during the global crisis. Significant role of FDI in the 
economy. The FDI fell and there was portfolio outflow. 
2. Market, per capita income, domestic savings: 
(a) Domestic market size / structure 
(b) Links to regional and global markets 
(c) Domestic savings Growth 
(a) Significant domestic market and demand; in 2008, GDP per capita (PPP basis) 
was US$ 8000.  
(b) Strong links to mainly the Asian markets (China, Japan, Hong Kong, 
Malaysia), Australia and the US  
(c) Consistent over the years at about 31 to 34%. 
3. Industrial structure:  
(a) Presence of diverse industrial structure  
(b) Strength of domestic firms 
(c) Presence and role of foreign firms 
(d) Links to foreign companies/ foreign 
financial market 
 
(a) Diversified sectors and the GDP share of different sector in 2009 were 
(estimate): agriculture: 12.3%, industry: 44%, services: 43.7% . Agriculture plays 
significant role in the economy. 
(b) Developing strong domestic firms. SET index fell by 45% as foreign investors 
exited and also equity market volatility rose significantly in 2008.  
(c) Less significant role of foreign investment/ firms. 
(d) Less significant exposure to foreign financial market. 
4. Financial Institutions: 
(a) Banking sector 
(b) Role and effectiveness of the Central Bank 
(c) Links to foreign financial market 
(a) Strong financial sector (after restructuring in post 1997-98 financial crisis). 
(b) Concerns about erosion of central bank’s independence in determining 
monetary policy. But the BOT announced interest rate cuts, credit expansion 
guarantees for SMEs and exporters, and commitment to flexible exchange rate 
system. 
(c) The financial sector has low exposure to global financial market, but links to 
export markets affected the sector. 
5. Foreign Trade: 
(a) Nature of exports 
(b) Export markets (Destinations) 
(c) Dependence on commodity exports 
 
(a) Exports growth declined from 17.2 % in 2007 to 5.1% in 2008 and to -13.0% in 
2009 due to global recession. Thailand’s exports included textiles and footwear, 
fishery products, rice, rubber, jewellery, automobiles, computers and electrical 
appliances.  
(b) Major export destinations and their share of its exports included (2009 
estimated) : US 10.9%, China 10.6%, Japan 10.3%, Hong Kong 6.2%, Australia 
5.6%, Malaysia 5% . 
(c) Significant dependence on agricultural and commodity exports.  
6. Skills, R&D, and Technology development: 
(a) Investment in education and skills (human 
resources) development 
(b) Investment in R&D 
 
(a) Investment in education and skills has been between 4 to 5% of GDP and 25 to 
30% of Total government expenditure over the years. New investments were 
announced in response to recession. 
(b) Investment in R&D has been between 0.25% of GDP over the years 
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Table 26: Some Major Components of NSI that Could have Mitigating Impact on Recession – 
Bangladesh 
 
Components of NSI  Nature/ Level of Presence in National Economy of Bangladesh 
1. The general investment climate and 
economic policy framework:  
(a) Macroeconomic and social stability 
(b) National fiscal policy regime 
(c) Foreign debt 
(d) Inflation 
(e) Interest rate and  
(f) Regulatory regime such as trade and tax 
policies 
(g) Nature and role of FDI  
(a) GDP growth dropped slightly from 6.4% in 2007 to 5.9% in 2009.  
(b) Current account balance was 1.4% of GDP in 2007, which declined to 0.9% in 
2008 and increased to 2.8% in 2009. Budget deficit has gone up from 3.7% in 2007 
to 4.6% of GDP in 2008, and reduced to 3.0% in 2009. 
(c) Total external debt remained about US$ 23b in 2008-2009. 
(d) Inflation increased from 7.2% in 2007 to 9.9% in 2008 and reduced to 6.7% in 
2009. 
(e) Reduced interest rate / The national currency Tk did not change much against 
US$ in 2007 and 2008. 
(f) Government announced a stimulus package of Tk.32.24b to manage the impact 
of the global financial crisis – to support exporters, state owned lenders and 
specific sectors.  
(g) Role of FDI stock is small – about US$7b in 2009 . FDI as % of GDP declined 
during 2007-08 and stood at 7%. The foreign exchange reserve was US$ 5.6b in 
February 2009. 
2. Market, per capita income, domestic savings: 
(a) Domestic market size / structure 
(b) Links to regional and global markets 
(c) Domestic savings Growth 
(a) Large informal sector comprising of domestic trade and commerce, and 
minimal exposure to international capital market. In 2009 GDP per capita (PPP 
basis) was US$ 1,600.  
(b) Strong links to Western countries market for exports and dependent on foreign 
aids. Also, economy depends on remittances from workers mainly in Malaysia and 
the Middle East. 
(c) The gross domestic savings has been 23-24% of GDP since 2001. 
3. Industrial structure:  
(a) Presence of diverse industrial structure  
(b) Strength of domestic firms 
(c) Presence and role of foreign firms 
(d) Links to foreign companies/ foreign 
financial market 
 
(a) GDP share of different sector in 2009 were (estimate): agriculture - 18.7% 
Industry - 28.7%, services - 52.6%. The remittances from expatriate workers play a 
major role in economy. In 2007-08 the remittance was US$7.9b in 2007-08 which 
amounted to 10% of GDP and 56.1% of exports. 
(b) Weak domestic firms. Small stock market.  
(c) Small role of foreign investment/ firms. 
(d) Very little or no exposure to foreign financial market. 
4. Financial Institutions: 
(a) Banking sector 
(b) Role and effectiveness of the Central Bank 
(c) Links to foreign financial market 
(a) Not a strong financial sector. 
(b) Relatively strong central bank - Bangladesh Bank (BB). It initiated a number of 
measures to ward off the impact of global financial crisis such as imposing lending 
rate cap at 13%, targeted lending programmes for listed commercial banks, and 
rescheduling of loan instalments receivable for major export sectors affected by 
global recession.  
(c) The financial sector has low exposure to global financial market due to “low 
integration with the world economy’. 
5. Foreign Trade: 
(a) Nature of exports 
(b) Export markets (Destinations) 
(c) Dependence on commodity exports 
 
(a) Exports growth declined from 15.9 % in 2008 to 10.1% in 2009 due to global 
recession. Bangladesh’s exports in 2008 were composed of Readymade garments 
(RMG) – 76%, Frozen food – 4%, Jute and Jute goods – 3%, Leather and Leather 
goods – 2%, and others – 15%.  
(b) Export destinations: US 24%, Germany 15.3%, UK 10%, France 7.4%, 
Netherlands 5.5%, Italy 4.5%, Spain 4.2% (2008). But global recession in Western 
markets did not affect exports seriously due to recession resistant low end market 
demands.  
(c) Significant dependence on commodity exports 7% of Total exports.  
6. Skills, R&D, and Technology development: 
(a) Investment in education and skills (human 
resources) development 
(b) Investment in R&D 
 
(a) Investment in education and skills has been between 2.4 to 2.7% of GDP (2005) 
and 14 to 15% of Total government expenditure (2005).  
(b) –N/A-- 
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Table 27: Some Major Components of NSI that Could have Mitigating Impact on Recession – Nepal 
 
Components of NSI  Nature/ Level of Presence in National Economy of Nepal 
1. The general investment climate and 
economic policy framework:  
(a) Macroeconomic and social stability 
(b) National fiscal policy regime 
(c) Foreign debt 
(d) Inflation 
(e) Interest rate and  
(f) Regulatory regime such as trade and tax 
policies 
(g) Nature and role of FDI  
(a) GDP growth dropped slightly from 4.7% in 2008 to 4% in 2009.  
(b) Current account balance was -0.1% of GDP in 2007, which improved to 2.6% 
in 2008. Budget deficit has remained around 4% of GDP in 2007 and 2008. 
(c) Total external debt remained about US$ 23b in 2008-2009. 
(d) Inflation increased from 6.4% in 2007 to 7.7% in 2008 and to 13% in 2009. 
(e) Reduced interest rate / The national currency Nepalese Rupee (NPR) 
appreciated against US$ in 2008 (NPR 65.2) and depreciated significantly 2009 
(NPR 77.4) due to devaluation 12.2% during 2008-09 to stimulate export growth. 
(f) Introduced reforms to tax administration, Bank and Financial Institutions Act to 
strengthen financial sector’s integrity and financial stability, and improvements to 
public expenditure management. But banking sector reforms are slow, enforcement 
of prudential regulation is weak, and the public sector accountability mechanisms 
are inadequate and also loose monetary conditions.  
(g) FDI stock – NA. The foreign exchange reserve was high (equal to 8 months 
imports) in 2009. 
2. Market, per capita income, domestic savings: 
(a) Domestic market size / structure 
(b) Links to regional and global markets 
(c) Domestic savings Growth 
(a) Small domestic market and minimal exposure to international capital market. In 
2009 GDP per capita (PPP basis) was US$ 1200.  
(b) Strong links to South Asian markets – India and Bangladesh, and some Western 
countries market for exports – US, and Germany and also on foreign aids. Also, 
economy depends on remittances from workers abroad.  
(c) The gross domestic savings has been 9-12% of GDP since 2001. 
3. Industrial structure:  
(a) Presence of diverse industrial structure  
(b) Strength of domestic firms 
(c) Presence and role of foreign firms 
(d) Links to foreign companies/ foreign 
financial market 
 
(a) GDP share of different sector in 2008: agriculture sector - 32%, the non-
agriculture sector was 68% , the share of manufacturing declined to 7% and the 
share of service sector increased from 47% to 51% . The remittances from 
expatriate workers play a major role in economy. 
(b) Weak domestic firms.  
(c) Small role of foreign investment/ firms. 
(d) No exposure to foreign financial market. 
4. Financial Institutions: 
(a) Banking sector 
(b) Role and effectiveness of the Central Bank 
(c) Links to foreign financial market 
(a) Although under developed, it is comparable to other counties in the region (Sri 
Lanka, and Bangladesh). The role of stock exchange in Nepal remained marginal. 
(b) The central bank – NRB has taken regulatory measures against risky bank 
activities to avoid crisis, particularly the real estate based and margin lending 
activities by commercial banks. As a result the stock prices have stabilised, 
although land prices remain high.  
(c) The financial sector has low exposure to global financial market due to “low 
integration with the world economy’. 
5. Foreign Trade: 
(a) Nature of exports 
(b) Export markets (Destinations) 
(c) Dependence on commodity exports 
 
(a) Exports growth increased from 1.2 % in 2007 to 11.0% in 2008. Nepal’s 
exports in 2008 were composed of clothing, pulses, carpets, textiles, juice, 
pashima, jute goods. Export sector is very small compared to the total economy. 
(b) Export destinations: India 54.8%, US 9.7%, Bangladesh 9.2%, Germany 4.7% 
(2008).  
(c) Significant dependence on commodity exports.  
6. Skills, R&D, and Technology development: 
(a) Investment in education and skills (human 
resources) development 
(b) Investment in R&D 
 
(a) Investment in education and skills has been about 3 to 3.5% of GDP (2005) and 
13to 15% of Total government expenditure (2005).  
(b) –N/A-- 
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10. Conclusions 
The research question we set out to investigate is the degree to which different 
countries with differing levels of National system of innovation (NSI) strength 
and weakness cope in mitigating some of the adverse impacts of the recession. 
For this we employed a conceptual framework of NSI and its potential 
mitigating impact on recession. On the NSI side we took six variables such as 
macroeconomic stability, market structure, per capita income and domestic 
savings, industrial structure, financial institutions, foreign trade and skills, R&D 
and technology development as relevant indicators of how changes in these 
indicators is correlated to the impact of the recession as much as these can be 
read through the available data. On the mitigating capability side we correlated 
whether the actions taken are defensive by taking measures like imposing 
protection, reduction in bank lending, consumer fear to spend and save and even 
hoard, reducing expenditure on education and R&D, reducing imports and 
finding new markets for reduced exports as a result of the recessionary downturn 
and changes in public policy. Using this conceptual framework we examined 
selected Asian economies – Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, Thailand, Bangladesh and 
Nepal address the above research question. We employed secondary descriptive 
data for analysing the case countries. 
 
The robustness of financial sector and government’s stimulus package has 
maintained the stability of the banking sector and financial markets in the face 
of serious global financial crisis in Korea. However, the national currency and 
the equity market experienced negative impact and its exports were hit 
significantly due to its trade links with markets such as the US which started the 
global recession. Despite negative impact of recession, the government has 
invested significantly in maintaining the high skilled work force, creating large 
number of jobs, and social cohesion. The national context, that is, NSI has 
influenced the nature of impact of the global recession and the ability to recover 
from it.  
 
Similarly, in the case of Taiwan, again it is evident that the NSI and its 
neighbourhood (China, Japan and ASEAN) have influenced the nature and 
shape of the impact of global recession and the speed of recovery. While 
Taiwan’s strong financial sector has helped it to mitigate serious fallout from the 
global crisis trigged in the western countries, its predominant reliance on export 
driven growth had led to contraction of its growth. However, the strength of its 
NSI appears to have helped it to recover from the impact of global recession 
faster. 
 
Malaysia’s open economy, its dependence on exports, and significant trade links 
with Western economies, have affected its economy significantly. However, it 
was able to avoid falling into deeper recession due to its strengths in its banking 
and financial system, high national savings, large foreign exchange reserve, 
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heavy investment in skills development, strong support to high value added 
manufacturing and services, measures to prevent large scale unemployment, and 
nurturing relatively high quality work force. Again its ability to take 
autonomous policy decision (e.g. even against the advice of IMF) has evidently 
helped its growth since the last Asian crisis in 1997-98 and also helped it to start 
recovery from the current global recession. 
 
Although Thailand was affected significantly by the global recession in areas 
such as exports, manufacturing output, stock market, imports, and 
manufacturing employment, it was able to come out of recession quickly 
because its economy is more diversified and relatively less exposed to the ailing 
world economies such as the US and EU, and also due to significant 
contribution by its agriculture sector that provided a buffer against capital 
markets. It was able to implement policy measures to stimulate domestic 
demand. Overall, the nature and shape of impacts of the global economic 
recession on Thailand appears to have been largely influenced by the strengths 
and weaknesses of its NSI and its links to it neighbourhood.  
 
Although Bangladesh was affected by the global recession mainly in the area of 
exports and remittances, the impact was not very severe because its economy is 
less integrated with the world economy. Also, because its predominant exports-
readymade garments are low priced product for low end market which is 
relatively recession resistant, the important role played by agriculture sector in 
its economy, presence of large informal sector, and minimal exposure to 
international capital market. Also, its economy depends on remittances from 
workers who are employed mainly in Malaysia and the Middle East. 
 
Although it was expected that global recession was likely to have some indirect 
impact on exports, tourism receipts, remittance flow, and aid flow, there was no 
serious impact. The reasons for the weak impact of global crisis on the national 
economy included the marginal role played by the stock exchange in Nepal, 
under developed financial system, the ability of the central bank - NRB to take 
regulatory measures against risky bank activities to avoid crisis, and the 
influence of it NSI neighbourhood, that is India, with its exchange rate pegged 
to Indian Rupee which helped maintain inflation broadly in line with that of 
India. 
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